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THESIS



**TIME FOR A CHANGE?
POST-COLD WAR U.S. GRAND STRATEGY
IN NORTHEAST ASIA**

by

Christopher A. Rodeman

December, 1994

Thesis Advisors:

Jan S. Breemer
Edward A. Olsen

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by

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
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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

Despite dramatic changes in the Northeast Asian security environment, America's regional grand strategy has continued to be guided by inertia. This thesis contends that a multipolar, balance of power system is emerging in Northeast Asia, and that the appropriate U.S. response is to adopt a grand strategy of "selective engagement."

While the first half of this thesis focuses on U.S. security interests, the Northeast Asian threat environment, and the shortcomings of post-Cold War U.S. policies, the second half describes the diplomatic, military and economic attributes of a selective engagement grand strategy. Recognizing that the age of geo-politics has not yet ended in Northeast Asia, U.S. diplomacy would endeavor to maintain equilibrium and prevent the rise of a regional hegemon by casting the United States in the role of balancer, grand facilitator, and honest broker. Militarily, a selective engagement approach would capitalize on the strengths of a maritime grand strategy to provide more flexibility at a lower cost. Finally, a grand strategy of selective engagement would acknowledge the centrality of economics to national security by linking economic policies directly to political and military strategy.

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1. Introduction	1
2. Literature Review	2
3. Methodology	3
4. Results	4
5. Discussion	5
6. Conclusion	6
7. References	7
8. Appendix	8
9. Glossary	9
10. Index	10
11. Bibliography	11
12. List of Figures	12
13. List of Tables	13
14. Acknowledgements	14
15. Author's Note	15
16. Declaration of Interest	16
17. Funding	17
18. Data Availability Statement	18
19. Ethics Statement	19
20. Informed Consent	20
21. Author Contributions	21
22. Conflict of Interest	22
23. Copyright	23
24. Publisher's Note	24
25. Supplementary Material	25
26. References	26
27. Appendix	27
28. Glossary	28
29. Index	29
30. Bibliography	30
31. List of Figures	31
32. List of Tables	32
33. Acknowledgements	33
34. Author's Note	34
35. Declaration of Interest	35
36. Funding	36
37. Data Availability Statement	37
38. Ethics Statement	38
39. Informed Consent	39
40. Author Contributions	40
41. Conflict of Interest	41
42. Copyright	42
43. Publisher's Note	43
44. Supplementary Material	44
45. References	45
46. Appendix	46
47. Glossary	47
48. Index	48
49. Bibliography	49
50. List of Figures	50
51. List of Tables	51
52. Acknowledgements	52
53. Author's Note	53
54. Declaration of Interest	54
55. Funding	55
56. Data Availability Statement	56
57. Ethics Statement	57
58. Informed Consent	58
59. Author Contributions	59
60. Conflict of Interest	60
61. Copyright	61
62. Publisher's Note	62
63. Supplementary Material	63
64. References	64
65. Appendix	65
66. Glossary	66
67. Index	67
68. Bibliography	68
69. List of Figures	69
70. List of Tables	70
71. Acknowledgements	71
72. Author's Note	72
73. Declaration of Interest	73
74. Funding	74
75. Data Availability Statement	75
76. Ethics Statement	76
77. Informed Consent	77
78. Author Contributions	78
79. Conflict of Interest	79
80. Copyright	80
81. Publisher's Note	81
82. Supplementary Material	82
83. References	83
84. Appendix	84
85. Glossary	85
86. Index	86
87. Bibliography	87
88. List of Figures	88
89. List of Tables	89
90. Acknowledgements	90
91. Author's Note	91
92. Declaration of Interest	92
93. Funding	93
94. Data Availability Statement	94
95. Ethics Statement	95
96. Informed Consent	96
97. Author Contributions	97
98. Conflict of Interest	98
99. Copyright	99
100. Publisher's Note	100
101. Supplementary Material	101
102. References	102
103. Appendix	103
104. Glossary	104
105. Index	105
106. Bibliography	106
107. List of Figures	107
108. List of Tables	108
109. Acknowledgements	109
110. Author's Note	110
111. Declaration of Interest	111
112. Funding	112
113. Data Availability Statement	113
114. Ethics Statement	114
115. Informed Consent	115
116. Author Contributions	116
117. Conflict of Interest	117
118. Copyright	118
119. Publisher's Note	119
120. Supplementary Material	120
121. References	121
122. Appendix	122
123. Glossary	123
124. Index	124
125. Bibliography	125
126. List of Figures	126
127. List of Tables	127
128. Acknowledgements	128
129. Author's Note	129
130. Declaration of Interest	130
131. Funding	131
132. Data Availability Statement	132
133. Ethics Statement	133
134. Informed Consent	134
135. Author Contributions	135
136. Conflict of Interest	136
137. Copyright	137
138. Publisher's Note	138
139. Supplementary Material	139
140. References	140
141. Appendix	141
142. Glossary	142
143. Index	143
144. Bibliography	144
145. List of Figures	145
146. List of Tables	146
147. Acknowledgements	147
148. Author's Note	148
149. Declaration of Interest	149
150. Funding	150
151. Data Availability Statement	151
152. Ethics Statement	152
153. Informed Consent	153
154. Author Contributions	154
155. Conflict of Interest	155
156. Copyright	156
157. Publisher's Note	157
158. Supplementary Material	158
159. References	159
160. Appendix	160
161. Glossary	161
162. Index	162
163. Bibliography	163
164. List of Figures	164
165. List of Tables	165
166. Acknowledgements	166
167. Author's Note	167
168. Declaration of Interest	168
169. Funding	169
170. Data Availability Statement	170
171. Ethics Statement	171
172. Informed Consent	172
173. Author Contributions	173
174. Conflict of Interest	174
175. Copyright	175
176. Publisher's Note	176
177. Supplementary Material	177
178. References	178
179. Appendix	179
180. Glossary	180
181. Index	181
182. Bibliography	182
183. List of Figures	183
184. List of Tables	184
185. Acknowledgements	185
186. Author's Note	186
187. Declaration of Interest	187
188. Funding	188
189. Data Availability Statement	189
190. Ethics Statement	190
191. Informed Consent	191
192. Author Contributions	192
193. Conflict of Interest	193
194. Copyright	194
195. Publisher's Note	195
196. Supplementary Material	196
197. References	197
198. Appendix	198
199. Glossary	199
200. Index	200
201. Bibliography	201
202. List of Figures	202
203. List of Tables	203
204. Acknowledgements	204
205. Author's Note	205
206. Declaration of Interest	206
207. Funding	207
208. Data Availability Statement	208
209. Ethics Statement	209
210. Informed Consent	210
211. Author Contributions	211
212. Conflict of Interest	212
213. Copyright	213
214. Publisher's Note	214
215. Supplementary Material	215
216. References	216
217. Appendix	217
218. Glossary	218
219. Index	219
220. Bibliography	220
221. List of Figures	221
222. List of Tables	222
223. Acknowledgements	223
224. Author's Note	224
225. Declaration of Interest	225
226. Funding	226
227. Data Availability Statement	227
228. Ethics Statement	228
229. Informed Consent	229
230. Author Contributions	230
231. Conflict of Interest	231
232. Copyright	232
233. Publisher's Note	233
234. Supplementary Material	234
235. References	235
236. Appendix	236
237. Glossary	237
238. Index	238
239. Bibliography	239
240. List of Figures	240
241. List of Tables	241
242. Acknowledgements	242
243. Author's Note	243
244. Declaration of Interest	244
245. Funding	245
246. Data Availability Statement	246
247. Ethics Statement	247
248. Informed Consent	248
249. Author Contributions	249
250. Conflict of Interest	250
251. Copyright	251
252. Publisher's Note	252
253. Supplementary Material	253
254. References	254
255. Appendix	255
256. Glossary	256
257. Index	257
258. Bibliography	258
259. List of Figures	259
260. List of Tables	260
261. Acknowledgements	261
262. Author's Note	262
263. Declaration of Interest	263
264. Funding	264
265. Data Availability Statement	265
266. Ethics Statement	266
267. Informed Consent	267
268. Author Contributions	268
269. Conflict of Interest	269
270. Copyright	270
271. Publisher's Note	271
272. Supplementary Material	272
273. References	273
274. Appendix	274
275. Glossary	275
276. Index	276
277. Bibliography	277
278. List of Figures	278
279. List of Tables	279
280. Acknowledgements	280
281. Author's Note	281
282. Declaration of Interest	282
283. Funding	283
284. Data Availability Statement	284
285. Ethics Statement	285
286. Informed Consent	286
287. Author Contributions	287
288. Conflict of Interest	288
289. Copyright	289
290. Publisher's Note	290
291. Supplementary Material	291
292. References	292
293. Appendix	293
294. Glossary	294
295. Index	295
296. Bibliography	296
297. List of Figures	297
298. List of Tables	298
299. Acknowledgements	299
300. Author's Note	300
301. Declaration of Interest	301
302. Funding	302
303. Data Availability Statement	303
304. Ethics Statement	304
305. Informed Consent	305
306. Author Contributions	306
307. Conflict of Interest	307
308. Copyright	308
309. Publisher's Note	309
310. Supplementary Material	310
311. References	311
312. Appendix	312
313. Glossary	313
314. Index	314
315. Bibliography	315
316. List of Figures	316
317. List of Tables	317
318. Acknowledgements	318
319. Author's Note	319
320. Declaration of Interest	320
321. Funding	321
322. Data Availability Statement	322
323. Ethics Statement	323
324. Informed Consent	324
325. Author Contributions	325
326. Conflict of Interest	326
327. Copyright	327
328. Publisher's Note	328
329. Supplementary Material	329
330. References	330
331. Appendix	331
332. Glossary	332
333. Index	333
334. Bibliography	334
335. List of Figures	335
336. List of Tables	336
337. Acknowledgements	337
338. Author's Note	338
339. Declaration of Interest	339
340. Funding	340
341. Data Availability Statement	341
342. Ethics Statement	342
343. Informed Consent	343
344. Author Contributions	344
345. Conflict of Interest	345
346. Copyright	346
347. Publisher's Note	347
348. Supplementary Material	348
349. References	349
350. Appendix	350
351. Glossary	351
352. Index	352
353. Bibliography	353
354. List of Figures	354
355. List of Tables	355
356. Acknowledgements	356
357. Author's Note	357
358. Declaration of Interest	358
359. Funding	359
360. Data Availability Statement	360
361. Ethics Statement	361
362. Informed Consent	362
363. Author Contributions	363
364. Conflict of Interest	364
365. Copyright	365
366. Publisher's Note	366
367. Supplementary Material	367
368. References	368
369. Appendix	369
370. Glossary	370
371. Index	371
372. Bibliography	372
373. List of Figures	373
374. List of Tables	374
375. Acknowledgements	375
376. Author's Note	376
377. Declaration of Interest	377
378. Funding	378
379. Data Availability Statement	379
380. Ethics Statement	380
381. Informed Consent	381
382. Author Contributions	382
383. Conflict of Interest	383
384. Copyright	384
385. Publisher's Note	385
386. Supplementary Material	386
387. References	387
388. Appendix	388
389. Glossary	389
390. Index	390
391. Bibliography	391
392. List of Figures	392
393. List of Tables	393
394. Acknowledgements	394
395. Author's Note	395
396. Declaration of Interest	396
397. Funding	397
398. Data Availability Statement	398
399. Ethics Statement	399
400. Informed Consent	400
401. Author Contributions	401
402. Conflict of Interest	402
403. Copyright	403
404. Publisher's Note	404
405. Supplementary Material	405
406. References	406
407. Appendix	407
408. Glossary	408
409. Index	409
410. Bibliography	410
411. List of Figures	411
412. List of Tables	412
413. Acknowledgements	413
414. Author's Note	414
415. Declaration of Interest	415
416. Funding	416
417. Data Availability Statement	417
418. Ethics Statement	418
419. Informed Consent	419
420. Author Contributions	420
421. Conflict of Interest	421
422. Copyright	422
423. Publisher's Note	423
424. Supplementary Material	424
425. References	425
426. Appendix	426
427. Glossary	427
428. Index	428
429. Bibliography	429
430. List of Figures	430
431. List of Tables	431
432. Acknowledgements	432
433. Author's Note	433
434. Declaration of Interest	434
435. Funding	435
436. Data Availability Statement	436
437. Ethics Statement	437
438. Informed Consent	438
439. Author Contributions	439
440. Conflict of Interest	440
441. Copyright	441
442. Publisher's Note	442
443. Supplementary Material	443
444. References	444
445. Appendix	445
446. Glossary	446

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	NATIONAL INTERESTS AND GRAND STRATEGY.....	5
	A. OFFICIAL U.S. INTERESTS WORLDWIDE.....	6
	B. OFFICIAL U.S. INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA.....	7
	C. DETERMINING BROAD AND ENDURING INTERESTS.....	9
	D. DETERMINING U.S. OBJECTIVES IN NORTHEAST ASIA.....	11
III.	THE NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.....	13
	A. UNLEASHING INDIGENOUS CONFLICT.....	15
	B. DIFFERENTIAL ECONOMIC GROWTH.....	17
	C. GEO-POLITICAL THINKING IN MOSCOW AND BEIJING.....	19
	D. DOMESTIC INSTABILITY.....	25
	E. THE KOREAN DILEMMA.....	26
	F. A NEW ROLE FOR JAPAN.....	27
	G. MILITARY TRENDS IN NORTHEAST ASIA.....	27
IV.	THE FAILURE OF POST-COLD WAR GRAND STRATEGY.....	37
	A. THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF PREEMINENCE.....	38
	B. THE DIFFICULTIES OF FORWARD PRESENCE.....	42
	C. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY.....	45
	D. THE U.S. BILATERAL SECURITY STRUCTURE.....	46
V.	THE DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF GRAND STRATEGY.....	55
	A. A PREMATURE FUNERAL FOR GEO-POLITICS.....	56
	B. THE BALANCE OF POWER.....	59
	C. TOWARD MORE FLEXIBLE ARRANGEMENTS.....	63
	D. AMERICA AS BALANCER AND GRAND FACILITATOR.....	64
	E. SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY TO ASIA.....	67

VI.	MAKING JAPAN A "NORMAL COUNTRY:" THE U.S. ROLE.....	71
	A. JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICIES IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD....	71
	B. JAPAN PREPARES TO TAKE THE STAGE.....	73
	C. TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP.....	78
	D. THE PROMISE OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY	83
VII.	THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF GRAND STRATEGY.....	91
	A. MARITIME VS. CONTINENTAL POWER.....	91
	B. FROM FORWARD DEPLOYMENT TO POWER PROJECTION..	94
	C. A FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY	99
VIII.	THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GRAND STRATEGY.....	105
	A. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE.....	107
	B. TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY.....	112
	C. STRATEGIC INDUSTRY.....	115
IX.	CONCLUSIONS.....	119
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	125
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	135

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The international climate in which America's grand strategy must today operate is far different from that of the 1950s, when it was designed. Without doubt, the most striking change is the collapse of the Soviet empire and the Warsaw pact which together accounted for one-half of a loosely bipolar world. The ideological factors and security concerns that once bound states to their respective camps no longer serve as an effective unifying force. Additionally, differential economic growth trends are changing the way many nations view their role in the international community. Both in Europe and in Northeast Asia--the two major playing fields of the Cold War--relatively predictable bipolarism is being replaced with uncertain multipolarism.

This new era in global politics sets the context for American grand strategy. The overriding strategic objective of the Cold War, containment of the Soviet threat within the Eurasian rimlands, prompted a grand strategy that is no longer suitable for protecting American interests throughout the world. A new strategic vision is needed to guide and shape U.S. policy into a form appropriate for today's multipolar climate. International and domestic considerations mandate that the United States adopt security policies that are both more flexible and cost-effective.

The importance of creating a new framework for U.S. grand strategy should not be underestimated. While the doctrine of containment and the clearly defined Soviet threat provided logic and coherence to postwar U.S. national security policy, the current threat environment is characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity. Without an overriding objective, it will become increasingly difficult to prioritize U.S. security interests, resulting in an *ad hoc* approach to grand strategy. This type of strategy, in which vital security interests are often confused with desirable objectives, poses the danger of pulling U.S. security policy in one of two undesirable directions: unbridled internationalism or traditional isolationism.

This thesis contends that while the international climate in Northeast Asia has changed dramatically in the last ten years, America's security policy has remained stagnant. Specifically, this thesis argues that a multipolar balance of power system is emerging in Northeast Asia, and that the appropriate U.S. response is to replace Cold War-era grand strategy with a grand strategy of "selective engagement." Rather than attempt to invent a new, monolithic threat to replace the Soviets, a grand strategy of selective engagement accepts the notion that U.S. national security policy can no longer be *threat-driven*, but should now be *uncertainty-pulled*.

In Chapter II, this thesis examines U.S. national security interests and how they relate to grand strategy. Chapter III surveys the Northeast Asian security environment, and what challenges it poses to U.S. national interests. Chapter IV describes current U.S. grand strategy in Northeast Asia, and its shortcomings vis-s-vis the post-Cold War security environment.

The second half of this thesis, Chapters V through VIII, argues the merits of a grand strategy of selective engagement. Chapter V describes the diplomatic, or foreign policy, aspects of a post-Cold War grand strategy. Chapter VI proposes solutions to the dilemma of Japan's enlarged role in Northeast Asia. Chapter VII elaborates on the military component, and Chapter VIII the economic dimension of the grand strategy. Finally, thesis conclusions are presented in Chapter IX.

I. INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War era, which is being built on the ruins of the Soviet empire and on the achievements of dynamic, capitalist countries, is defined by new balances of power, revised perceptions of power, and far greater diplomatic complexity. In this new era, regions have more distinct identities, and international leadership is more ambiguous in structure and, often, in the way it is exercised. Asia epitomizes the new complexity.¹

The international climate in which America's grand strategy must today operate is far different from that of the 1950s, when it was designed. Without doubt, the most striking change is the collapse of the Soviet empire and the Warsaw pact, which together accounted for one-half of a loosely bipolar world. The ideological factors and security concerns that once bound states to their respective camps no longer serve as an effective unifying force. Additionally, differential economic growth trends are changing the way many nations view their role in the international community. Both in Europe and in Northeast Asia--the two major playing fields of the Cold War--relatively predictable bipolarism is being replaced with uncertain multipolarism.

This new era in global politics sets the context for American grand strategy. The overriding strategic objective of the Cold War, containment of the Soviet threat within the Eurasian rimlands, prompted a grand strategy that is no longer suitable for protecting American interests throughout the world. A new strategic vision is needed to guide and shape U.S. policy into a form appropriate for today's multipolar climate. International and domestic considerations mandate that the United States adopt security policies that are both more flexible and cost-effective.

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¹ Richard J. Ellings and Edward Olsen, "A New Pacific Profile," *Foreign Policy* Winter 1992-93: 116.

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Paul Kennedy, in his introduction to *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, draws on Edward Mead Earle and Sir Basil Liddell Hart to define grand strategy as the orchestration of elements of policy for the preservation of the nation's long-term interests that: are concerned with both peacetime and wartime planning; reconciles and balances ends and means; and goes beyond the battlefield to consider national morale, resources, culture, and diplomacy.⁴ John Collins in *Grand Strategy: Practices and Principles*, interprets grand

² Term borrowed from Andrew C. Goldberg, "Selective Engagement: U.S. National Security Policy in the 1990s," *The Washington Quarterly* Summer 1992: 15-24.

³ Colin Gray "Strategic Sense, Strategic Nonsense," *The National Interest* Fall 1992: 17.

⁴ (New Haven: Yale U Press, 1991) 1-7.

strategy as "the art and science of employing national power under all circumstances to exert desired degrees and types of control over the opposition through threats, force, indirect pressures, diplomacy, subterfuge, and other imaginative means, thereby satisfying national security interests and objectives."⁵

In Chapter II, this thesis examines U.S. national security interests and how they relate to grand strategy. Chapter III surveys the Northeast Asian security environment, and what challenges it poses to U.S. national interests. Chapter IV will describe current U.S. grand strategy in Northeast Asia, and its shortcomings vis-s-vis the post-Cold War security environment.

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⁵ (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973) 14.

II. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND GRAND STRATEGY

'Cheshire puss,' she began rather timidly, . . . 'would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?'

'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' said the cat.

Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland⁶

Any discussion of grand strategy must begin with the interests and objectives upon which it is based. "At the highest levels, national interests comprise the underpinnings for sound strategy."⁷ If the role of strategy is to rationally relate means to ends, then our task in analyzing current strategies and proposing new ones must begin with an examination of U.S. security interests. National security interests, vis-a-vis the goals and objectives to which they give rise, act as the fundamental ends served by a grand strategy. The purpose of this chapter is to survey the broad spectrum of opinion concerning America's security interests, and determine which are the most enduring and salient ones in the post-Cold War environment.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty in revising or creating any policy is reaching a consensus on interests. Among academics and policy-makers there is a nearly limitless range of views concerning national security. Moreover, while policy-makers may agree on a general set of security interests, they often disagree on the weight, or relative priority of individual objectives. Such has been the case of American foreign and security policies for over 200 years, as "realist" policies have clashed with "idealist" policies, sometimes referred to as *Wilsonianism*.

⁶ Quoted in Collins *Grand Strategy* 1.

⁷ Collins *Grand Strategy* 1.

A. OFFICIAL U.S. INTERESTS WORLDWIDE

Official government documents provide the most authoritative, yet still diverse account of U.S. national security interests. The 1991-1992 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, published by the Bush administration, lists and prioritizes four overarching interests:

1. *The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.*
2. *A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.*
3. *Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.*
4. *A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.*⁸

The policy statements of the Clinton administration concerning national security interests have reflected both change and continuity with the past. In place of the Bush administration's four overarching interests, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* states generally that the U.S. government is responsible for protecting the lives and personal safety of Americans, maintaining the political freedom and independence of the nation, and providing for the nation's well-being and prosperity. In order to facilitate these interests, the 1994 document focuses on three primary objectives: enhancing security through military means, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy abroad.

⁸ George Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: USGPO, 1991).

B. OFFICIAL U.S. INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA

Addressing East Asia and the Pacific specifically, the Clinton strategy "envision[s] an integrated strategy--a New Pacific Community--which links security requirements with economic realities and our concern for democracy and human rights."⁹ While the three pillars of this "New Pacific Community" that are spelled out by the document are not ultimate "ends," but rather are means, the basic security interest at the heart of each is evident. First, the strategy points to the importance of combatting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula and in South Asia. Second, it encourages the development of "multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and opportunities." Lastly, the strategy urges support for the "wave of democratic reform sweeping the region."¹⁰

A 1992 Department of Defense report to Congress, entitled *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim*, proposed a set of Asia-specific goals that included both ends and means:

- *Protection of the United States and its allies from attack;*
- *Maintaining regional peace and stability;*
- *Preserving U.S. political and economic access;*
- *Contributing to nuclear deterrence;*
- *Fostering the growth of democracy and human rights;*
- *Stopping the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missile systems;*
- *Ensuring freedom of navigation; and*

⁹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington: USGPO, 1994) 23.

¹⁰ *Engagement and Enlargement* 24.

- *Reducing illicit drug trafficking.*¹¹

Another indicator of security interests as perceived by the Clinton foreign policy team was provided by Winston Lord during his confirmation hearings for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on March 31, 1993. Lord designated the following ten major goals, not listed in any order, for American policy in Asia and the Pacific:

- Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance of responsibilities;
- Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation on the Korean peninsula;
- Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with China where political openness catches up with economic reform;
- Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and scope;
- Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing in action as we normalize our relations with Vietnam;
- Securing a peaceful, independent and democratic Cambodia;
- Strengthening APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) as the cornerstone of Asian-Pacific economic cooperation;
- Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances;
- Spurring regional cooperation on global challenges like the environment, refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation, and arms sales; and
- Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower.¹²

¹¹ Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress 1992* (Washington: USGPO, 1992) 2-9.

¹² Karen A. Hasselman, "The National Interests of the United States in Southeast Asia: Policy Changes for Their Protection and Promotion Since the Withdrawal from the Naval

C. DETERMINING BROAD AND ENDURING INTERESTS

An examination of executive branch policy statements highlights several obstacles in determining the national security interests of the United States. The first difficulty is separating interests from objectives. Though often used interchangeably in policy declarations, the difference is important. For instance, the most vital of national security interests is certainly the "survival of the State, with an 'acceptable' degree of independence, territorial integrity, traditional lifestyles, fundamental institutions, values, and honor intact."¹³ This is unquestionably a security *interest*, and also one on which the overwhelming majority of American citizens could agree. "Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances," however, is not a core national interests, but an objective through which an interest can be served. While one Administration may believe America's security depends on its alliance relationships, another may not.

A second complication stems from the varying degrees of importance different Administrations place on different interests. For example, both the Bush and Clinton national security strategies list the promotion of democratic values as an important interest, but the Clinton approach places far more emphasis on "democratic enlargement," and actually elevates it from a mere interest to a essential security policy tool. Throughout America's history security interests have waxed and waned in relative importance as public opinion and national leadership have expressed shifting priorities. Because grand strategies are meant to provide a framework for long-term planning, the interests that guide those policies must be broad and enduring. In order to ensure a fresh start, it is necessary

Base at Subic Bay," Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 1993: 16.

¹³ Collins *Grand Strategy* 1.

to go right to the heart of the national security interests served by a grand strategy. There is no better place to start than the Constitution of the United States. The preamble states:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Although the first three clauses are distinctly domestic issues, the last three have obvious implications for national security. A more modern phrasing might read "ensure the defense of the United States, its citizens and possessions from foreign attack; foster the economic well-being of the nation; and safeguard the U.S. constitutional system, and the liberties it guarantees from subversion or external interference." While more ephemeral concerns may also hold validity, these immutable interests should always form the core of any national security concept.

Donald Nuechterlein, in his 1991 book *America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World*, argues that throughout "the nation's history four long-term, enduring national interests have conditioned the way the U.S. government viewed the external world and this country's place in it." These enduring interests accurately reflect the core interests of the United States as they are defined by the Constitution, and add to them some basic interests that have developed since its drafting:

1. *The defense of the United States and its constitutional system;*
2. *The enhancement of the nation's economic well-being and promotion of U.S. products abroad;*
3. *The creation of a favorable world order (international security environment); and*

4. *The promotion abroad of U.S. democratic values and the free market system.*¹⁴

These broad interests are the ends to be served by U.S. grand strategy. In order to link these ends with available assets, or means, it is first necessary to determine objectives. By applying U.S. national security interests to Northeast Asia, it is possible to gain an understanding of the types of objectives that might be accomplished by a grand strategy.

D. DETERMINING U.S. OBJECTIVES IN NORTHEAST ASIA

America's broad and enduring interests--the defense of the United States; enhancement of nation's economic well-being; creation of favorable world order; and promotion of U.S. values abroad--can be applied to contemporary Northeast Asia in order to determine America's most fundamental objectives in that region. Although many more specific objectives could be suggested, this thesis contends that U.S. interests in the region would be best facilitated by: (1) the maintenance of Northeast Asian stability; and (2) guarding against the emergence of a regional hegemon, be it military, political, or economic. Hence, these interest-derived objectives should be the ends served by the means of grand strategy.

¹⁴ (Lexington: U of Kentucky Press, 1991) 17.

III. THE NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The grand strategy of the United States acts as the link between national assets and objectives. Strategy, however, does not operate in a vacuum. If grand strategy is to be effective, this flexible connection between ends and means must adapt to its environment. The changes that have occurred in Northeast Asia's security climate, beginning in the early 1970s and culminating with the dissolution of the Soviet empire, mandate a reappraisal of U.S. security policy. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the complex and potentially threatening environment that is developing in Northeast Asia, and the dangers it presents to American security interests.

At the heart of the post-Cold War climate in Northeast Asia is a transformation in the fundamental structure of the international system. The loosely bipolar arrangement that had existed since 1945 has given way to a far more complex pattern of relationships. Where power was formerly concentrated primarily in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union, second-order powers like Japan and China are gaining importance and influence, particularly at the regional level. While the United States may remain the only true superpower well into the next century, the emergence of local great powers could signal a unique structural dichotomy, in which global unipolarity coexists with regional multipolarity. Aaron Friedberg postulates:

The movement toward 'multi-multipolarity' is being propelled by political developments as much as by shifts in the underlying distribution of material resources. In this new and more fragmented world, the United States will still be the richest and strongest nation (although the size of its economic and military leads will diminish as others grow faster and as the United States reduces its armed forces), but it will be less inclined to project its power into every corner of the globe. Meanwhile, other nations will become more capable

*of acting independently in pursuit of their own interests and, whether out of ambition or necessity, more inclined to do so.*¹⁵

The bipolarity that once existed in Northeast Asia was a creation of the Cold War which began in Europe, and spread to Asia as the United States and the Soviet Union divided the world into spheres of ideological influence. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union came the final blow to bipolarity. No longer constrained by security concerns, Japan has begun to parlay its status as an economic superpower into regional influence, and possibly leadership.¹⁶ Beijing, which found itself marginalized in world politics by the easing of Moscow-Washington tensions, has likewise embarked on a course designed to increase China's regional influence.¹⁷ Even Seoul, no longer content to rely on the United States for guidance, has begun to contemplate the role of South Korea, or a unified Korea, in a multipolar Northeast Asia.¹⁸

Northeast Asia may be the most heavily militarized region in the world. Though the United States will continue to hold an overall lead in military capability into the foreseeable future, locally U.S. forces could face formidable threats. Similarly, economic success has increased the leverage of regional powers. South Korea has created a strong economy and a

¹⁵ Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security* Winter 1993-94: 6.

¹⁶ See Chalmers Johnson, "Japan in Search of a 'Normal' Role, *Daedalus* Fall 1992: 1-33.

¹⁷ See Weixing Hu, "China's Security Strategy in a Changing World," *Pacific Focus* Spring 1993: 113-134., and Bonnie S. Glaser "China's Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions," *Asian Survey* March 1993:252-271.

¹⁸ See Han Sung-Joo, "Fundamentals of Korea's New Diplomacy," *Korea and World Affairs* Summer 1993: 227-245., and Cha Young-Koo and Kim Taeho, "The Emerging World Order and Korea's Changing Security Climate in Northeast Asia," *Korea and World Affairs* Spring 1993: 111-134.

diverse portfolio of trading partners. Moreover, many economists have forecast that the gross domestic product of China may surpass that of the United States early in the next century.¹⁹

These political, military, and economic realities suggest that the distribution of power that has characterized Northeast Asia since the Second World War is a thing of the past. Because this Cold War hierarchy provided the context in which American security policy has operated for nearly the last five decades, U.S. diplomacy will need to make adjustments to the new conditions. Future state-to-state relations in Northeast Asia are likely to be far more intricate and uncertain. The "strategic triangle" (PRC-USSR-US) that Beijing's leadership endeavored to construct has blossomed into a complex pattern of relations among states, each with its own agenda, strengths, and liabilities.

This increased complexity of international relations is not in itself a threat to regional security. In fact, Northeast Asia may prove more stable with five or six major powers than with two or three. The context in which U.S. grand strategy must operate, however, has changed. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has not produced a benign regional threat environment. On the contrary, a number of factors--both structural and domestic--provide reason for concern. The remainder of this chapter will address these complications.

A. UNLEASHING INDIGENOUS CONFLICT

The first concern is that indigenous conflicts, long suppressed by the Cold War and the attendant bipolar structure, will resurface. The potential sources of Northeast Asian conflict are plentiful, and at a minimum include: long-standing Sino-Russian border disputes; competing Russian and Japanese claims to the Northern Territories or Southern Kurile Islands; the unresolved dispute between Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks in the southern Sea of Japan; divided sovereignty on the Korean peninsula, where 1.4 million ground

¹⁹ Murray Weidenbaum, "Greater China: A New Economic Colossus," *The Washington Quarterly* Autumn 1993: 77.

forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) remain deployed against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ); competing sovereignty claims of the Chinese regimes on mainland China and Taiwan; the unresolved dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands in the East China Sea; and because of their potential impact on the vital oil and trade routes of the South China Sea, the competing claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands among China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines.²⁰

Although it can be argued that Europe may face a similar rebirth of indigenous conflict, there is a crucial difference between the two regions. While there has been the development of a plethora of multilateral regimes in Europe during the past forty years, this has not occurred in Asia. According to Friedberg:

*Next to Europe, Asia appears strikingly under-institutionalized. The rich 'alphabet soup' of international agencies that has helped to nurture peaceful relations among the European powers is, in Asia, a very thin gruel indeed.*²¹

During the Cold War, the overriding gravity of superpower confrontation decreased the salience of many regional and sub-regional animosities, however, the redistribution of Northeast Asian power to multiple poles could now allow them to reemerge. For now, conflict resolution in Northeast Asia will have to depend upon progress in bilateral relations, though there is little historical experience to guide this process. In fact, there is almost no record of indigenous modern international relations in the region. "For almost all of this century Asia has been dominated by foreign powers: first the European empires and later the superpowers."²² Without effective bilateral relations or multilateral forums to ameliorate

²⁰ Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," *International Security* Winter 1993-94: 88.

²¹ Friedberg 22.

²² Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," *Survival* Summer 1994: 7-8.

tensions. flareups could present a threat to Northeast Asian stability in general, and U.S. interests specifically.

B. DIFFERENTIAL ECONOMIC GROWTH

A second danger related to the developing multipolar structure is that differential economic growth could create tensions among the new great powers, most probably between China and Japan. Denny Roy, in his article "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," advances this argument on a number of points:

I argue that a burgeoning China poses a long-term danger to Asia-Pacific security for two reasons. First, despite Japan's present economic strength, a future Chinese hegemony in East Asia is a strong possibility. China is just beginning to realize its vast economic potential, while Japan's inherent weaknesses create doubts about the ability of the Japanese to increase or sustain their present level of economic power. China also faces less resistance than Japan to building a superpower-sized military. Second, a stronger China is likely to undermine peace in the region. Economic development will make China more assertive and less cooperative with its neighbors; China's domestic characteristics make it comparatively likely to use force to achieve its political goals; and an economically powerful China might provoke a military buildup by Japan, plunging Asia into a new cold war.²³

In economic terms, there is no doubt that China has the potential for great power. While conventional measures indicate an economically tri-polar world, revolving around the United States, Japan and the European Community (particularly Germany), in terms of global trade, market size and "sheer economic bulk," China is becoming a fourth pole in the international system. This is particularly true if one looks at "Greater China," consisting of the People's Republic, Hong Kong and Taiwan. World Bank projections place Greater China's net imports in the year 2002 at US\$639 billion, compared to US\$521 billion for

²³ *International Security* Summer 1994: 149-150.

Japan. Moreover, using comparable international prices, Greater China in the year 2002 is projected to have a gross domestic product of US\$ 9.8 trillion, compared to US\$ 9.7 trillion for the United States. "If those forecasts hold, in other words, Greater China would not just be another economic pole; it would be the biggest of them all."²⁴

The realist notion that an increasingly wealthy China will create tension in East Asia runs contrary to contemporary liberal arguments that greater economic interdependence decreases the likelihood of military conflict. However, there are at least four reasons to qualify this optimism. First, the degree of interdependence that actually exists varies greatly from state to state in the region, and even within states themselves, such as in China. China and Taiwan have not yet become members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and even when they join, the process of achieving greater transparency and openness is likely to provoke resistance from powerful vested interests.²⁵

The second qualifier to the optimism of post-modern liberalism contends that rapid economic growth notwithstanding, levels of interdependence within East Asia have failed to keep pace with the European Union. Regional trends suggest that the most developed states in Northeast Asia are seeking global rather than local connections. Although the states of Northeast Asia may be willing to discuss greater openness in trade with North America or Europe, they seem unwilling to do so in their own backyard. As the economies of Northeast Asia continue to develop they should be better able to provide markets for each other, but the absence of an effective regional economic institution suggests that the disputes that will arise from the contest for market share are likely to be acrimonious.²⁶

A third qualifier to the logic of liberal optimism in Northeast Asia is that economic interdependence is not necessarily a protection against tension and conflict. As demonstrated

²⁴ Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," *Foreign Affairs* Nov-Dec 1993: 61.

²⁵ Buzan and Segal 12.

²⁶ Buzan and Segal 12.

by the U.S.-Japanese relationship before the Second World War, economic interests have often been advanced as a reason to intervene, rather than a cause for abstention. Neither has interdependence quieted the arguments of Northeast Asian geo-politicians who continue to underscore the military aspects of national economic security in regions such as the South China Sea and the Russian Far East.²⁷

Finally, we should approach critically the tendency of those who advance the interdependence argument to use Europe as an example that greater economic integration makes conflict less likely. While it may be true that democracies seldom fight each other, it is not true that all market economies are democratic. Although most European nations are now democracies, Northeast Asia contains: two non-Western democracies (Japan and South Korea); one authoritarian, proto-capitalist state (China); one Stalinist regime (North Korea), and one large question mark (Russia). "What is certainly true is that these political and economic cultures are less transparent than Western models and, therefore, conflict and misunderstanding among them are more likely."²⁸

C. GEO-POLITICAL THINKING IN MOSCOW AND BEIJING

The third general danger associated with the international system evolving in Northeast Asia is that this structure will encourage the regional predisposition to think "geo-politically." Its nuclear deterrent notwithstanding, Moscow's proclivity to think in nineteenth century

²⁷ For a Japanese view, see Shigeo Hiramatsu, "China's Naval Advance: Objectives and Capabilities," *Japan Review of International Relations* Spring 1994: 118-132. For a Chinese example, see Ross H. Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where it Expects War--Where it Doesn't," *Orbis* Summer 1994: 355-372. For a Russian view, see Feliks Gromov, "Russia's National Interests at Sea and the Navy," *JPRS Report: Central Eurasia* (JPRS-UMT-93-008-L) 27 July 1993: 1-6.

²⁸ Buzan and Segal 14.

balance of power terms has been evident throughout the Soviet period and continues to this day.

Russia is likely to remain weak in the Far East well into the next century. Many of Russia's leaders believe that because of this weakness, the nation's interests in Northeast Asia are now more dependent on a stable regional balance of power. Alexei Arbatov, in his article "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," asserts:

*In the Far East the interests of Russia (in contrast to those of the USSR) may be best served by the maintenance of an American political role and military presence. In the case of a US withdrawal, Japanese reaction could be no other than remilitarization, in view of the rapid growth of the economic and military power of China.*²⁹

This concern with Japan highlights a trend in Russian security thinking. Russians are now more preoccupied with regional security issues than they were during the Cold War. Uncertainties near Russia's frontiers with Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, North Korea and Japan have sent the Kremlin in search of reliable partners.

Of growing importance in Russian domestic politics is a loose grouping of moderate-liberals who claim to be represented in governmental, political, and academic circles. Self-proclaimed moderate-liberals, such as Alexei Arbatov, contend that their views are more realistic and pragmatic than those of the "pro-Western" Yeltsin group, and insist on the necessity of a distinctly Russian foreign policy. They assert that Russia's foreign and security policies should be based on the specifics of its geo-political position and its transitional domestic situation.³⁰

Leszek Buszynski refers to the moderate-liberals as the "geopolitical" opinion group. Buszynski's "geopoliticals" perceive the current leadership's political values as the product of a premature effort to associate with the West, thereby outstripping the geo-political and

²⁹ *International Security* 18.2 (1993) 36.

³⁰ Arbatov 10-12.

security needs of Russia. "which is predominantly located in Asia."³¹ The geopolitics believe Moscow has, for economic reasons, placed too much emphasis on Japan, and not enough on China. They see Japan "as a traditional rival of Russia," and regard China as a balancing force.³² This group of moderate-liberals is but one element of a growing segment of Russian thinkers and statesmen who believe that given Russia's weakness, its regional security objectives in Northeast Asia can be best met by returning to traditional balance of power policies, which rely less on unilateral strength, and more on the balancing behavior of other states to counter the growth of a regional hegemon.

Rather than structuring its policies to facilitate entry into a interdependent world, in which trans-border concerns have, to some degree, altered traditional precepts of state sovereignty, Beijing seems "to be patiently embarked on a new 'Long March' to become the first among roughly equal great powers that can enjoy freedom of action through a strong military presence and posture in a neo-imperial manner."³³ David Shambaugh in his article, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," discusses the political culture and national historical experiences that have shaped China's world view:

The first of these is the Chinese sense of impermanence. Chinese leaders and international relations specialists believe the world is in constant flux as national power increases and decreases relative to other nations. Stasis is seen as an abnormal and deceptive condition. Disequilibrium is the norm. Constant and careful attention is, therefore, paid to incremental shifts in the balance of power and constituent elements of power. Realist theory has found a receptive audience among China's international relations community. At any given time, some nations are in the ascent (gong) while others are in relative decline (shou). Sometimes nations in internal decline seek to expand their power

³¹ Leszek Buszynski, "Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region," *Pacific Affairs* 65.4 (1993) 506.

³² Buszynski 506-507.

³³ Larry M. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great Power Status," *Orbis* Spring 1994: 157-158.

*externally, which Chinese analysts argue is the case with the U.S. today. Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is currently very popular in China's strategic studies circles.*³⁴

This belief in the impermanence of relationships requires maintaining independence and flexibility, characteristics that enable the Chinese to make their presence felt in ephemeral alignments and *ad hoc* coalitions. These non-binding political, military, and economic relationships are not perceived in Beijing as a compromise to China's jealously guarded sovereignty. Furthermore, these arrangements provide the fluidity Beijing deems necessary to participate in the balance of power game. The "strategic triangle" that Beijing sought to cultivate in its Cold war-era superpower relations is one example of this geo-political mindset. Current patterns of Chinese bilateral relations suggest an ongoing concern with the balance of power.

Most Chinese officials and scholars perceive the world in balance of power terms, and look for differences among major powers that can be exploited to protect and advance Beijing's interests.³⁵ Chen Qimao, Chairman of the Academic Council of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, offers a Chinese view of the post-Cold War environment:

*The world is transforming from a bipolar to a multipolar structure and is now in a volatile situation of strategic imbalance. While the old tension between the superpowers has lapsed and some old regional rivalries have been solved or alleviated, new territorial disputes, ethnic strife, and religious differences left over from history but disguised by the bipolar structure are beginning to resurface and intensify in some areas, causing serious turmoil and even bloody conflict and war. Forces are being realigned... international economic competition is growing bitter, replacing the arms race as the main form of rivalry among the major powers.*³⁶

³⁴ *Survival* Summer 1994: 44.

³⁵ Glaser "China's Security Perceptions" 253.

³⁶ "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Era," *Asian Survey* March 1993: 237.

Another source of geo-political thinking in modern China stems from the belief that nations behave according to their position in a particular historical epoch and type of political-economic system. Marxist, Leninist and Maoist stage theories of history and international relations still "implicitly underlie many Chinese assessments of world affairs and international security"³⁷ Although the Chinese have softened their assessment of the West somewhat, Lenin's theory of imperialism and Mao's concept of hegemonism still play an important role in Beijing's world view. "Anti-hegemonism remains the *sine qua non* of Chinese foreign policy, deriving largely from modern China's historical experience of encroachment, partition and manipulation by foreign powers."³⁸

In the wake of the Cold War, China's geo-political world view may influence its leaders to perceive the United States--the only remaining superpower--as a serious threat to the Northeast Asian balance of power. Beijing characterizes U.S. grand strategy in post-Cold War Asia as designed to ensure American primacy, or even hegemony. Chinese analysts identify three elements in a strategy begun by the Bush administration, and continued by President Clinton, that seeks to create a "New World Order" in which America would reign preeminent diplomatically, militarily and economically. The first element aims to create a multilateral security organization to reinforce U.S. bilateral treaties and security arrangements. The second component consist of an aggressive free trade policy that is, in reality, a protectionist measure designed to pressure Asian states into giving American businesses unfair advantages. The final element involves a U.S. attempt to use the issues of human rights and democratization to subvert governments unfriendly to the United States.³⁹

China's response to geo-political threats could have several implications for regional security and U.S. interests. First, Beijing may react to perceived foreign hegemony in a

³⁷ Shambaugh "Growing Strong" 45-46.

³⁸ Shambaugh "Growing Strong" 46.

³⁹ Shambaugh "Growing Strong" 50-51.

historically Chinese way: by expanding the buffer zones around the "middle kingdom." Although further expansion on land is unlikely, it cannot be ruled out. Expansion of China's maritime buffers, however, seems to be a reality. China is beginning to think less like a continental power, and more in maritime terms. No longer confident of their central strategic position, leaders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have begun to regard the oceans as an extension of the land buffers China has historically sought.⁴⁰ Moreover, Beijing can no longer ignore the fact that China's astounding economic growth is inextricably tied to maritime matters. It is becoming apparent to China's leaders that the People's Republic needs a capable, ocean-going navy to defend against infringements on its rights to navigation, mineral resources, and fishing grounds.⁴¹

Another possible Chinese reaction to geo-political threats may be to limit Beijing's participation in multilateral security and economic forums. China's propensity to mild autarky, and apparent aversion to interdependence and integration is a direct outgrowth of its historical experiences with compromised state sovereignty and hegemonism:

*Underlying Beijing's condemnation of unipolar hegemonism lies a world view shared by China's elite that is more appropriate to the late sixteenth, rather than the twentieth, century. It is a view premised on immutable state sovereignty, in which strict non-interference in the internal affairs of other states is the abiding norm.*⁴²

Finally, the most likely Chinese response to perceived systemic threats is the construction of a foreign policy that is designed to reap geo-political advantage by cultivating good relations, and possibly alignments with non-threatening partners, while avoiding alliance and long-term commitments that might limit flexibility. Some Senior PLA officers regard the United States as China's principal adversary today and in the foreseeable future, and favor a security alignment

⁴⁰ Wortzel 158.

⁴¹ You Ji and You Xu, "In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990s," *Pacific Review* 4.2 (1991): 137-138.

⁴² David Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," *Survival* Summer 1992: 92.

with Russia.⁴³ Other Chinese predict that in the long run the United States will "seek a new strategic partnership with China, perhaps to counter Japanese power in Asia or to resist a resurgent, expansionist Russia," and have even suggested that Japan will seek a tacit strategic partnership with China to counter American power.⁴⁴

D. DOMESTIC INSTABILITY

Dangers to Northeast Asian stability and American interests do not result solely from the multipolar international structure and its characteristics; they also have domestic sources in each of the region's states. Particularly ominous is the possibility that China, torn apart by differential growth among the provinces, or by the contradictions of economic liberalization without corresponding political change, might collapse into civil war and chaos. An economic and political disintegration of the People's Republic could bring about a situation reminiscent of China's warlord era in the first half of this century. Neighboring states--either in response to perceived dangers such as refugees or factional violence, or possibly seeking to regain territory once lost to an expansionist China--might feel compelled to intervene, thus drawing more of the region into conflict. Conversely, a besieged Beijing regime, believing a foreign episode may distract the disgruntled masses from domestic issues might initiate a pedagogical or irredentist expedition against a vulnerable neighbor. Finally, the Chinese empire could, in a relatively peaceful manner, breakup into several autonomous states, thus creating new sources of potential tension and exponentially complicating regional interstate relations.⁴⁵

⁴³ Ross H. Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where it Expects War--Where it Doesn't," *Orbis* Summer 1994: 356.

⁴⁴ Glaser "China's Security Perceptions" 253-254.

⁴⁵ Roy "Hegemon on the Horizon" 153.

A similar threat of instability and conflict is posed by the political and economic woes prevailing throughout the Russian Republic. While the fragmentation of the former Soviet empire has thus far been limited to European and Central Asian regions, the possibility of a breakaway Siberian republic cannot be discounted. Moreover, the tumultuous situation within Russia may eventually prove too much for the moderate Yeltsin government, and give rise to an ultra-nationalist or reactionary regime. As demonstrated by the frightening proclamations of Russian nationalists, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky's December 1993 remarks to the effect that he would "... sail our large navy around their (the Japanese) small island and if they so much as cheeped, I would nuke them,"⁴⁶ a hard-line government might appeal to nationalist affinities in the humiliated Russian people, and set out to reclaim the lost territory of "Great Russia."

E. THE KOREAN DILEMMA

The peaceful reunification of the Koreas, while generally a positive step for Northeast Asian stability, would also create a number of new issues and anxieties. Not only would a unified Korea possess an extremely large and well-armed military force, but in all likelihood it would be capable of producing and deploying nuclear weapons. Although a Korea unified under Seoul's terms would presumably embrace market-democracy, its threatening potential would nonetheless continue to trouble Japan. Aggravating this situation would be Korea's historical (and pragmatic) predilection to fall into China's orbit. While Korea would be a geo-political "card" any Northeast Asian power would be happy to hold, its alignment with the People's Republic could be cause for consternation in Japan, the United States, and possibly Russia.

⁴⁶ Geoffrey Till, "Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* March 1994: 177.

F. A NEW ROLE FOR JAPAN

Finally, Japan's transformation from an economic power to a "normal" great power could be perceived as a threat by the nations of Northeast Asia. Contemporary debate in Japan points to several international and domestic pressures for a change in Japan's post-World War II national security doctrine. First among them is the inevitable and ongoing evolution of the U.S.-Japan relationship. The end of the Cold War and Japan's meteoric rise to economic great power status have altered the salience of issues. As the United States and Japan struggle to resolve matters such as the trade imbalance and Japan's international role in the post-Cold War world, the old relationship is bound to change. A related factor is the absence of a unifying threat, like the Soviet Union, to help smooth over non-security related differences. Although presently a minor force, a rising tide of Japanese nationalism might also influence Japan's world view. Finally, Japan's desire to be treated like a traditional great power, and not just an economic force has fueled the domestic grand strategy debate.⁴⁷ If this internal debate brings about a recasting of Japan's foreign and security policies to a form more fitting to a normal great power, the repercussions throughout the region could be significant. Without reliable multilateral institutions to assuage the concerns of China, Russia, and the Koreans, their historical fear of Japanese expansionism could result in a destabilizing chain of actions and reactions.

G. MILITARY TRENDS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Threats to Northeast Asian peace and stability also emanate from regional trends in military procurement and strategy. Although these military issues are not necessarily dangerous, when they are considered together with the structural and domestic factors discussed above, they paint a picture of region characterized by peril and uncertainty. Four broad trends are evident in

⁴⁷ Patrick M. Cronin and Noboru Yamaguchi, "Japan's Future Regional Security Role," *Strategic Review* Summer 1992: 17.

Northeast Asian military security thinking. First, the widespread conviction that quality is more important than quantity has made technological modernization a universal objective. This trend is not limited to China, Japan and Russia, but is apparent throughout the region. Desmond Ball, in his article "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," notes a significant degree of consistency in regional arms-buying programs. Systems that have elicited the most interest include:

- *national command, control and communications systems;*
- *national strategic and tactical intelligence systems;*
- *multi-role fighter aircraft with maritime attack and air superiority capabilities;*
- *maritime surveillance aircraft;*
- *anti-ship missiles;*
- *modern surface combatants--destroyers, frigates, ocean patrol vessels;*
- *submarines;*
- *electronic warfare systems; and*
- *rapid deployment forces.*

It is worthwhile to note that Ball was *not* writing solely about systems with maritime application. Without question, this congruence in acquisition manifests a regional focus on naval and maritime issues.⁴⁸

The second regional trend reflects a transformation in force structure. Although the armed forces of many smaller Asia-Pacific nations are becoming larger, the armies and fleets of the great powers of Northeast Asia are becoming smaller. China has embarked on a deliberate and long-term plan to convert its huge, but ineffective fleet of 1950s and 60s vintage aircraft, tanks and patrol boats into a smaller, more balanced fighting force. Although much of Russia's military downsizing is not intentional, naval leaders have nevertheless embraced fully the notion that Russian interests will be better served by a smaller, more modern defense establishment.⁴⁹ Particularly indicative of this trend are recommendations by the Japanese prime minister's defense

⁴⁸ Ball "Arms and Affluence" 81.

⁴⁹ Gromov "Russia's National Interests" 5.

advisors that the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF), which is already a small, highly capable force, be reduced further in size to make funds available for modernization.⁵⁰ The implications of this shift are that the great powers of Northeast Asia, particularly China, are transforming their large, rail-transported, defensive armies into smaller, more mobile forces, better suited for rapid, offensive operations.

An increased ability to project power distinguishes the third regional trend. The last decade has seen China establish a marine corps, and construct the necessary sea- and airlift to transport large PLA units. Some analysts believe China now has the capability to deploy an entire division beyond its shores.⁵¹ Japanese planners have called for an expansion of the SDF's meager airlift and amphibious forces with the justification that such a capacity would provide greater mobility to self-defense forces among the Japanese home islands, and would be useful in conducting international relief operations. Russia's new military doctrine stresses the importance of air and maritime forces capable of striking an opponent's key installations, however Moscow is unlikely to provide much funding for these forces until the domestic situation improves.

The final, and potentially most dangerous trend in Northeast Asian military thinking is the unambiguous genesis of a "cult of the offensive." Much like the dogma responsible for European offensive war doctrines prior to World War I, military officers and strategists in Russia and China have become convinced that aggressive preemption is the most viable form of defense. In contrast to the chiefly defensive doctrines that prevailed in post-World War II East Asia, Russian and Chinese strategic thinking is dominated by the so-called "lessons" of Desert Storm, and the military-technical revolution. Evident in Russian military and academic writing and Chinese force reconstruction is an overt or underlying belief in striking first, striking hard, and striking fast. The passive defense implies inaction, and the consequences of inaction are perceived to be sudden annihilation.

⁵⁰ "Panel Urges 'Leaner', Active Defense Force," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* EAS-94-156 (online) 12 Aug. 1994.

⁵¹ Wortzel 171-172.

Perhaps more than any other event, the conduct of the Gulf War has changed the way that the Soviets, and their Russian successors view modern warfare. Russian military strategists are nearly unanimous in their conviction that allied doctrine in Operation Desert Storm heralded the beginnings of an age of "electronic-fire," high-tech war. General-Major I.N. Vorob'yev recently summarized the central lessons of Desert Storm, beginning with a statement unprecedented for both the Soviet and Russian press: the Iraqis lost the Gulf War because they fought with Soviet doctrine and Soviet weaponry. Moreover, Vorob'yev calls for new military thinking from Russia's officers, who he asserts are still preparing to fight World War II:

According to Vorob'yev, Desert Storm was one of those rare 'turning points' in military affairs--akin to the Franco-Prussian War--that stands at the juncture of two epochs in military art. It ended the era of multimillion-man armies and began that of high-technology wars fought in the air, space, and 'ether (airwaves).' While in past wars new armaments were employed only singly, in Desert Storm a multitude of new systems was used on a mass scale.⁵²

An examination of the writings of prominent Russian strategic thinkers reveals a belief in several related tenets comprising this paradigm of technological warfare. First, the initial period of the war, in which the aggressor will make coordinated, simultaneous attacks throughout the entire depth of the defender's territory, will be decisive. Second, the increased potency of air and naval forces, particularly when matched with advanced conventional munitions (ACMs), will render the massed deployment of ground formations by the aggressor unnecessary and, by the defender, unwise. Third, the age of positional, or combined positional-maneuver warfare has given way to complete dominance by maneuver warfare strategies. Finally, strategic non-nuclear forces, utilizing ACM technology will become essential for both attack and deterrence.⁵³

These perceived trends have important implications for Russian military doctrine and strategy. Possibly the most far-reaching belief is that defensive, non-aggressive doctrines are not

⁵² Mary C. FitzGerald, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," *Naval War College Review* Spring 1993: 31.

⁵³ FitzGerald 25-35.

effective in the new age of warfare. Related to this are the convictions that the enemy must be engaged as far forward as possible, and that preemption is necessary to gain the decisive advantage of the initial period. Stemming from this reverence for high-tech offensives is the assumption that ACM, electronic warfare (EW), and C3I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) technologies are crucial to Russia's security. Furthermore, the creation of a reliable defense against both tactical and strategic ACMs is viewed as essential. Indeed, one of the most interesting implications of this modern war paradigm is the inference that the lines between tactics and strategy are disappearing. This concept is rooted in the belief that strategic aims can now be accomplished in the initial phase of conflict, conceivably in one overwhelming tactical victory.⁵⁴

Mary FitzGerald, in her 1993 article "Russia's New Military Doctrine," compares this work with the 1990 Soviet military doctrine and finds at least five key changes. First, the primary wartime objective of the armed forces has expanded from "to repel aggression" to "repel aggression and defeat the opponent." Second, in 1990 the main development goal was to structure forces to "repel aggression;" in 1992, it is to "optimize" the table of organization and equipment for all possible wars and combat missions. Third, while the Soviet version held that nuclear war "will" be catastrophic for all mankind, the Russian document holds that it "might be," and implies that limited nuclear war-fighting is now a possibility. Fourth, the 1990 doctrine held that conventional "sufficiency" meant that no large-scale offensive operations could be conducted. In 1992, however, conventional "sufficiency" means that no large-scale offensive operations can be conducted "without additional deployments." Finally, the 1990 doctrine stressed that Soviet military art was based on "defensive strategy," and that the USSR excluded the option of a preemptive strike. The 1992 doctrine deletes these provisions, and maintains that the Russian

⁵⁴ FitzGerald 26-33.

armed forces will conduct "all forms of military action;" will conduct defense and offense equally, and will seize the *strategic initiative to destroy the opponent*.⁵⁵

By the mid-1980s, it was evident that China's leadership perceived changes in the regional security environment. Improved relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union had created a far less threatening environment in East Asia, however, new types of instability were becoming more probable, or at least more salient. Beijing now considered local, limited conflicts to be the most likely threat to the security interests of China. While these threats were not unimportant, their decreased severity allowed the military to focus on long-term modernization and strategic planning.⁵⁶

The new security climate brought about by these changes in the international system required a rethinking of the long-sacred "people's war" doctrine, and its derivative "active defense" strategy. The 1985 meeting of the Central Military Committee produced two concepts which dramatically altered PLA doctrine and strategy. While retaining the base terminology, the CMC's new definitions of "people's war *under modern conditions*," and "active defense *under new historical conditions*," differ significantly from the Maoist concepts.⁵⁷

No longer a strictly defensive strategy, "active defense under new historical conditions" stresses three key elements: first, the initial phase of the war is considered to be decisive; second, extended strategic depth, both offensive and defensive, is crucial; and third, a modern, professional military is demanded.⁵⁸

Though doctrinal changes have taken place throughout the Chinese military, they are most evident in the PLA Navy (PLAN). The reconceptualization of the naval aspects of this

⁵⁵ FitzGerald 36-37.

⁵⁶ Shulong Chu, "The PRC Girds for Limited, High-Tech War," *Orbis* Spring 1994: 178.

⁵⁷ Chu 186.

⁵⁸ Alexander C. Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications," *Naval War College Review* Summer 1994: 14.

strategy has centered around the redefinition of two key concepts, offshore and active defense.⁵⁹ The Maoist naval strategy of "offshore active defense" interpreted offshore as meaning essentially "coastal." The architects of the PLA Navy's "offshore active defense under new historical conditions" however, view offshore in a very different way. Though not specific in their definition of offshore, PLA naval leaders typically describe their area of responsibility as the "territorial seas" of China. This vast region encompasses 2.5 million square kilometers of water, and includes the combined Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of mainland China, Taiwan, and all the disputed islands.⁶⁰ Similarly, the term "active defense" has taken on new meaning for a new age. Whereas the Maoist "active defense" truly was a defensive strategy, albeit with the option for offensive *tactics*, the revised active defense strategy recognizes that modern conditions may require an offensive strategy to provide the best defense.

In addition to protecting China's "traditional" territorial seas, the PLAN's current leadership assert the navy's missions include actions to capture, occupy and defend islands; protection of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs); coastal defense; and strategic deterrence.⁶¹ According to Vice-Commandant Lin Zhiye of the Dalian Naval Vessels Academy, the PLA Navy has several immediate goals. First, the navy needs to develop a larger radius of action, to include all of the surrounding seas. Second, the PLAN should create the force structure necessary to maintain sea and air control in a given area. Third, the navy should strengthen its rapid response capability. Fourth, the PLAN must enhance its amphibious capabilities. Finally, the navy must expand and improve its ability to conduct strategic deterrence.⁶²

Strategy has not been the only aspect of naval doctrine affected by the domestic and international forces discussed above. Indeed, modernization programs have been a central part

⁵⁹ Huang 17.

⁶⁰ Hiramatsu "China's Naval Advance" 121-122.

⁶¹ You 142.

⁶² Hiramatsu 121.

of the doctrinal transformation that has occurred since 1985. Moreover, the perceived "lessons" of the Gulf War have had a profound impact on China's grand strategic debate. While rapid modernization may have been a debatable element of the new naval doctrine prior to the war, Desert Storm has finally put those arguments to rest.⁶³ China's national leadership is now firmly behind the PLAN admirals in insisting that the navy's force structure and weapons systems be brought up to modern standards, either by indigenous production or, if necessary, by foreign acquisition. Although Beijing may not yet be ready to buy the navy its aircraft carrier, they probably agree that the PLAN needs one.

Current modernization programs are placing emphasis on force structure, infrastructure, systems, and manpower. The PLAN has planned its force structure development in three phases. By the year 2000 China intends to build a modern navy, whose primary attack forces will consist of land-based medium range aircraft and attack submarines, while mid-sized surface vessels equipped with helicopters are to serve as fleet command and protective forces. The second phase, which should occur between 2000 and 2020, will see PLAN task forces centered around aircraft carriers, and composed of balanced air, surface, and submarine elements. These task forces will gradually break away from the West Pacific, and enter oceans around the world. Finally, beyond the year 2020, the PLAN assumes its capability will be "that of a major sea power."⁶⁴

The perils of an abrupt shift to offensive doctrine, even if for defensive reasons, are plain: one nation's defensive measures are often seen by another to be threatening, particularly when those measures involve offensive weapons and strategy. This threat perception prompts a defensive reaction, which in turn is also seen as threatening. Repeating over and over again, this cyclical phenomenon is known as the security dilemma. Security dilemmas can often result in arms races, create regional instability, and increase the likelihood that misunderstandings or

⁶³ Chu 188.

⁶⁴ You 141.

misperceptions might lead to war. In a region characterized by historic suspicion, hostility, and tension, a "cult of the offensive," and the security dilemma in which it results, can only signal danger on the horizon.

The intent of this chapter has not been to create a new Northeast Asian bogeyman, or to argue that the region is as dangerous as it was during the height of the Cold War. Indeed, the end of superpower confrontation in Northeast Asia has probably reduced the danger of great power hostilities, and certainly lessened the possibility of a nuclear exchange. The post-Cold War regional security environment, however, is by no means benign.

The relatively stable bipolar structure that characterized Northeast Asia during the Cold War has been superseded by a multipolar system. Moreover, several systemic and domestic factors suggest that the principal U.S. interests in Northeast Asia--maintaining stability, and preventing the rise of a regional hegemon--are still faced with very real threats. The central question now becomes how U.S. grand strategy should compensate for this multipolar environment and protect America's fundamental interests, in the face of powerful domestic and international pressures to retrench. In the next chapter, this thesis contends that U.S. policy-makers have, so far, failed to adequately address this dilemma.

IV. THE FAILURE OF POST-COLD WAR GRAND STRATEGY

Above all else, the security environment that now prevails in Northeast Asia must be characterized as uncertain. Without question, the United States has many vital interests at stake in the region, and there is no doubt that a multitude of dangers to those interests exists. The task that now faces America's security planners is to construct a coherent and viable grand strategy for the post-Cold War era; a strategy that can ensure U.S. interests in Northeast Asia at a cost that is acceptable to the American people. In this monumental task U.S. policy-makers have thus far been unsuccessful. The objective of this chapter is to describe the direction national security policy has taken since the end of the Cold War, and explain why these new directions are unsuitable for protecting America's interests in post-Cold War Northeast Asia.

Rather than debate the details of the Bush and Clinton national security strategies, or delve into the specific Northeast Asian "doctrines" of the State and Defense Departments, this chapter considers the character of post-Cold War grand strategy in the broadest sense. Although grand strategy is typically defined as possessing political, military and economic aspects, at this high level of analysis, these distinctions tend to blur. Rather than perpetuate artificial divisions, this thesis examines the overall direction of U.S. security policy in the form of four general precepts which define post-Cold War grand strategy. Furthermore, while economic policy is not addressed specifically, there are many aspects of political and military policy which relate to the economic aspects of grand strategy.

Beginning with the Bush national security strategy of August, 1990, U.S. defense planners have attempted to revise American grand strategy for the post-Cold War era. Follow-on works, such as the 1991-1992 National Security Strategy, written in the wake of the Gulf War, and the 1992 Department of Defense report to Congress, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim*, expanded and clarified the administration's approach

to grand strategy. Central to the Bush strategy for securing U.S. interests in Northeast Asia were the fundamental Cold War concepts of forward presence and the maintenance of bilateral security arrangements. Additionally, the Bush administration introduced the phrase "New World Order" in reference to a post-Cold War world in which America, by virtue of its political, military, and economic preeminence, would serve as "catalyst and consciousness-raiser" in a system of increasingly interdependent states. "This approach assumes that with capitalism and democracy triumphant throughout the globe, like-minded national leaders can now frame collective solutions to fundamental international problems more easily than in the past."⁶⁵

The national security policies of the Clinton administration, both in theory and practice, differ little from those promulgated under Bush. Aside from placing greater emphasis on economic security and "promoting democracy" abroad, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (July 1994) is premised on the same set of concepts that formed the Bush strategy: U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic preeminence; forward presence; collective security; and bilateral security arrangements. The balance of this chapter will examine each of these four precepts, and will argue that while it may be unwise to suddenly abandon them, a U.S. grand strategy that is founded on them is likely, in the long-term, to fail.

A. THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF PREEMINENCE

Despite the realities of the emerging multipolar regional environment discussed in Chapter III, U.S. national security strategy has thus far failed to consider a context in which U.S. primacy is unsustainable. The foreign and defense policies of the Bush and Clinton administrations have not only been premised on unipolarity, but have suggested

⁶⁵ Goldberg "Selective Engagement" 15-16.

strategies aimed at preventing or discouraging other great powers from "even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."⁶⁶ Christopher Layne, in his article "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," presents a comprehensive argument--based on structural realist theory and historical example--against this U.S. grand-strategic assumption. In describing this flawed strategy, Layne states:

*This strategy is not overtly aggressive; the use of preventive measures to suppress the emergence of new great powers is not contemplated. It is not, in other words, a strategy of heavy-handed American dominance. Rather the strategy of preponderance seeks to preserve unipolarity by persuading Japan and Germany that they are better off remaining within the orbit of an American-led security and economic system than they would be if they became great powers.*⁶⁷

Layne begins his argument with the premise that states balance against hegemons, even those "that seek to maintain their preeminence by employing strategies based more on benevolence than coercion." Furthermore, from his examination of similar historic periods and structural realist theory, Layne concludes that unipolarity is inherently unstable primarily for two reasons: first, unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own destruction because the hegemon's unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to the emergence of new great powers; and second, the entry of new great powers into the international system erodes the hegemon's relative power and, ultimately, its preeminence.⁶⁸ Layne expresses his conclusions succinctly:

⁶⁶ Initial draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for FY 1994-99 and leaked to the *New York Times*. See "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent Re-emergence of a New Rival'," *New York Times*, 8 Mar. 1992: A14 and, Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," *New York Times*, 8 Mar. 1992: A1. Cited in Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* Spring 1993: 5-6.

⁶⁷ Layne "Unipolar Illusion" 7.

⁶⁸ Layne "Unipolar Illusion" 7.

Inevitably, a strategy of preponderance will fail. A strategy of more or less benign hegemony does not prevent the emergence of new great powers. The fate of nineteenth-century Britain, which followed such a strategy, is illustrative. A strategy of benign hegemony allows others to free-ride militarily and economically. Over time, the effect is to erode the hegemon's preeminence. A hegemon tends to overpay for security, which eventually weakens the internal foundation of its external position. Other states underpay for security, which allows them to shift additional resources into economically productive investments. Moreover, benign hegemony facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals. As a consequence, differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great powers.⁶⁹

Applied to Northeast Asia, Layne's argument may serve as a warning that not only is sustained preeminence unlikely, but a grand strategy that seeks to guarantee U.S. primacy may actually accelerate the decline of America's position. In the geo-political maneuverings of China can be seen a nation motivated by the fear of American hegemony. Though it is possible that any U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia short of total disengagement may be seen as provocative in Beijing, it is probable that China's leaders perceive hegemonic ambition in American proclamations of a "New World Order" and democratic enlargement.

Unquestionably, America has paid more for security in Northeast Asia than any of its current allies. While this investment may have been easily justified during the Cold War, it is possible that the United States is now overpaying. Having assumed primary responsibility for the defense of Japan and South Korea--and the rest of Northeast Asia from the threat of renewed Japanese militarism--the United States has placed itself in an unenviable position. While America expends its precious resources ensuring regional stability, economically sound Northeast Asian nations are, in fact, "free-riding" militarily and, to some degree, economically. This American shield is now allowing Japan and

⁶⁹ Layne "Unipolar Illusion" 34.

South Korea, two nations who could afford to bear more of the regional defense burden, to invest a greater portion of their available capital in productive ventures.

America's "benign hegemony" has also allowed China the benefit of a relatively peaceful environment in which to construct and modernize a market economy. Similarly, the open nature of the trading structure built on U.S. assurances has facilitated the diffusion of American wealth and technology to all the nations of Northeast Asia.

In the end, it is only the results that matter. The astounding economic growth rates of nearly every nation in East Asia should provide clear warning that a U.S. grand strategy that assumes sustainable preeminence is bound to fail. As the economic power of the nations of Northeast Asia continues to gain in relation to American strength, a U.S. attempt to maintain its relative political and military position may prove disastrous, further skewing the strategic balance, and exasperating crucial domestic problems.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ For an interesting discussion of a failed grand strategy for managing relative decline, see J. H. Elliot, "Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain," *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven: Yale, 1991): 87-104. Elliot recounts the failure of Spanish policy in the first half of the seventeenth century. Though the Spanish monarchy had once reigned supreme in the world, military setbacks and financial difficulties had diminished its ability to compete with modernizing powers such as Britain and France. Countduke Olivares, like many of his contemporaries, believed Spain's decline could only be reversed by a return to the moral highground she had once claimed. Olivares embarked on a policy, not of managing decline, but of restoring greatness. The goal of Spanish grand strategy became to reinitiate a war that "would at once purify and reinvigorate Castile and restore the king of Spain to his proper, and God-assigned position as the greatest monarch in the world." Instead of disengaging, Spain's new 'Union of Arms' redoubled its military efforts in the Spanish Netherlands, Italy and later France. The strain on the monarchy's kingdoms and provinces brought about by these conflicts imminently resulted in critical uprisings in Catalonia and Portugal, and the further demise of Imperial Spain.

B. THE DIFFICULTIES OF FORWARD PRESENCE

As with U.S. preeminence, the centrality of forward military presence to Northeast Asian grand strategy may provide short-term benefits, but in the long-run may be untenable. There are several arguments to justify this position. First, the changing nature of statehood in Northeast Asia might pull the welcome mat out from under U.S. troops. Although most contemporary policy-makers in both Japan and South Korea support the forward deployment of U.S. forces, this situation has already shown signs of change. One reason is the transformation of the regional security environment. Without the perception that their very survival is being threatened by the communist giants and their proxies, opinion-shapers in Japan and South Korea may soon begin to question the need for U.S. troops on their soil.

Contributing to this reexamination of Cold War security arrangements is the phenomenal economic growth experienced by both Japan and South Korea, and the impetus this growth has provided for these nations to act more like "normal" powers. No longer content to influence regional events in the economic realm alone, many Japanese and Koreans want to see their nations secure a larger political and military role. Given a larger role, Northeast Asians may come to view a force structure that is directly tied to U.S. military strategy and posture as a compromise of their own sovereignty and an impediment to independent action. Moreover, a growing number of regional policy-makers fear that America, itself no longer constrained by the immediacy of the Soviet threat, will increasingly use its role as sole-guarantor of regional security to gain leverage in other, non-security matters. Japan's contentious negotiations with the United States over trade issues provides one example.⁷¹

⁷¹ Layne "Unipolar Illusion" 35.

A second factor that may work against continued forward presence is domestic opinion in the United States. Despite the assurances of American military planners that keeping U.S. troops deployed in Japan is actually cheaper than bringing them home, the current national preoccupation with domestic issues could eventually result in strong pressure to retrench. As Americans struggle with crime, drugs, poverty, healthcare and other pressing concerns, convincing them that American troops should remain in Asia to protect wealthy Japanese and Koreans from an ambiguous threat, or even worse, Asians from the Japanese, will become more difficult. While the Cold War provided the American people with a clear ideological foe, the post-Cold War era, as yet, does not. Although it may be possible to persuade the U.S. public that America should remain engaged in Northeast Asia, and that it should retain the military capability to project power into the region, this is an entirely different matter than maintaining 75,000 troops in Japan and Korea.⁷²

A third reason why the future of forward presence may be uncertain is the questionable military significance of those forces. As the U.S. defense budget declines and military planners are asked to do more with less, it will become increasingly important that available forces be both flexible and extremely effective. The current American military posture in the region holds more political than military significance. U.S. troops in Japan, rather than serving to protect the Japanese homeland from attack, now have more value as a safeguard against aggressive Japanese rearmament, and the possibility of a destabilizing regional arms race. Similarly, while U.S. forces still provide important C3I and infrastructure capabilities to South Korean defense, the primary purpose of the U.S. Army's 2nd Division is to serve as a tripwire for guaranteed American intervention. In the region as a whole, U.S. forces matter less as an influence on the local balance of power than as a reaffirmation to Asians that America intends to remain engaged. While

⁷² *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim* 22.

this reaffirmation is important. there are alternative strategies that would prove more flexible and cost-efficient. As political circumstances continue to evolve, these missions may become badly out of step with reality. Consequently, U.S. forces, without either a political or military role could become a strategic anachronism. Over-stretched, the armed forces of the United States will not be able to allow such a large portion of its available force to be relegated to strategic insignificance:

*There are of course costs associated with forward deployment. Flexibility is sacrificed. Units earmarked for a particular region or theater cannot easily be committed to deal with a contingency elsewhere. As the particular scenarios for which we have planned over the last forty years become less probable, force planners will have to seriously reevaluate many aspects of forward deployment.*⁷³

Finally, forward presence limits American grand strategy by seemingly obligating the United States to defend certain nations with no precondition of reciprocity. In the emerging multipolar regional system, coalitions and alignments are likely to be more ephemeral than during the relatively predictable Cold War era. This fluidity in Northeast Asian politics will require a grand strategy whose political and military elements are able to adjust and compensate for the changing environment. By maintaining large units on foreign soil, the United States is, in effect, committing itself to binding, long-term obligations. Although the sudden withdrawal of American forces from Japan and Korea could have undesirable results, a long-term national defense strategy that is premised on forward presence is not only unsustainable, but could have the effect of limiting U.S. options and flexibility.

⁷³ Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty," *Strategic Review* Spring 1990: 13.

C. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The variety of collective security referred to in this Section describes the type of policies promulgated by the Bush administration under the rubric of "New World Order," and by the Clinton administration as "democratic enlargement." Though these policies have significant differences, they possess one fundamental commonality: they both envision a world in which democratic, market-oriented, peace-loving nations, under the benevolent leadership of the United States, will unite against pariah-states to maintain the status quo. There are several reasons to doubt this optimistic scenario.

First and foremost, collective security schemes often fail because "polities will not pay high costs to advance interests other than their own."⁷⁴ The proponents of collective security believe in the viability of such a system because they assume that states share a number of common interests. The reality, however, is that while states may have some objectives in common, by and large they are guided by their own unique set of interests. President Bush may have patterned his vision of a "New World Order" on the coalition-building that enabled victory in the Gulf War, but instances of such international consensus are rare. Consequently, giving collective security a central role in U.S. grand strategy only serves to mislead Americans into believing the United States will always be able to assemble and lead a preponderant coalition to protect their interests.

The Clinton administration's proposition that America's security can be improved by a policy of democratic enlargement presents similar problems. The rationale behind democratic enlargement is the hypothesis that democracies are less likely to fight one another, and furthermore, that a world community of democratic nations would bind together in the face of a common threat (collective security). Although few would disagree with the supposition that a world of democratic nations would be safer than a

⁷⁴ Gray "Strategic Sense" 12.

world of authoritarian states, there are no guarantees.⁷⁵ Moreover, form of government notwithstanding, states will still perceive, advance and defend their own set of objectives. Other than a vague sense of a more peaceful environment, democratic enlargement does not serve to advance American interests vis-a-vis states who feel their own interests are threatened.

America's leadership role in democratic enlargement is even more problematic to grand strategy. Although it may be in the national interest to encourage and support democracy when possible, elevating enlargement from a goal to a primary tool of foreign and defense policy is bound to create tensions. While human rights may be a universal value, democracy is not. Espousing the spread of democratic government once again sets the United States in the position of the ideological crusader, determined to reshape the world in its image. This assault from the moral high ground will not play well in culturally unique Northeast Asia. Aggressive enlargement places the United States on a collision course with China and North Korea, thus limiting the flexibility of U.S. security strategy in a region characterized by uncertainty and change. Additionally, a strategy of active enlargement suggests tactics of frequent intervention. If recent U.S. experiences in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Somalia and Haiti are any indication, the American people may grow weary of paying high costs in the name of abstract ideology. A grand strategy rooted in enlargement, and thus interventionism, would thus become untenable.

D. THE U.S. BILATERAL SECURITY STRUCTURE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

At the very heart of U.S. grand strategy in post-Cold War Northeast Asia is the maintenance of post-World War II bilateral security arrangements. One does not have to

⁷⁵ For an argument against the proposition that democracies do not fight each other, see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* Fall 1994: 5-49

read far into the national security strategies of Presidents Bush and Clinton, or the strategy and planning documents of the Departments of State and Defense to realize that this system remains central to American policy. But is this structure still viable in today's dynamic, multipolar regional environment? There are several reasons to question the feasibility, and even desirability of this policy.

An argument can be made that, as a result of the monumental changes that have taken place in the regional structure and security environment, contingencies could arise in which the United States will either be unable to maintain its current bilateral security relationships, or in which the continuation of those relationships would result in a destabilizing tilt in the regional balance of power. The emergence of a dangerous imbalance in Northeast Asia would almost certainly have a detrimental influence on vital U.S. national interests. Rather than clinging blindly to outdated Cold War structures, American grand strategy should reflect the reality that the day may soon come when bilateral arrangements with Japan and South Korea are no longer possible. Discussed below are four contingencies that could mandate a redirection of U.S. grand strategy, and a divestment of bilateral security ties.

1. Japan becomes a "normal" power:

Although there is still widespread opposition in Japan to an enlarged military role, there appears to be an emerging consensus that Japan should play a larger part in international affairs. The end of the Cold War and the increased salience of regional issues have prompted many political elites to question Japan's post-war abstention from Northeast Asian politics. "There is a growing inclination to play an active role in world affairs, in spite of the supposed constitutional restrictions on the use of military force."⁷⁶

Ted Galen Carpenter, in his book *A Search For Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War*, points to a number of indications that Tokyo is seeking a less dependent (on

⁷⁶ Ted Galen Carpenter, *A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War* (Washington: CATO, 1992): 56.

the United States) role. Among them he lists: an aggressive foreign aid program; a growing national defense intelligence structure; overtures to Southeast Asian nations concerning a regional security dialogue; and plans to acquire and store plutonium.

Taken individually or collectively, those developments do not prove that Japan has embarked on a concerted effort to develop an assertive political or military posture. They do, however, suggest that Japan seems to be hedging its bets. An independent intelligence apparatus, for example, is a crucial prerequisite for an independent security strategy. Similarly, a stockpile of plutonium gives Japan the option of developing a nuclear weapons arsenal if the political leadership subsequently decides that the U.S. nuclear shield is no longer reliable or that the U.S.-Japanese alliance is no longer in the country's best interests. The underlying reason for Tokyo's recent actions appear to be a quest for more options in the security realm.⁷⁷

The end of the Cold War has not created a more favorable security context for Japanese strategic planners. In fact, many of Japan's leaders have voiced concern that the "new world order" may be more dangerous than the old, primarily due to instability. Other concerns include: China's growing maritime interests and capabilities; still-potent Russian nationalism; a power-vacuum and possible Chinese hegemony in the South China Sea; and North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Japan's specific maritime concerns in the South China Sea are that a Chinese bid for hegemony, or tensions created by the rapid growth of Southeast Asian navies could lead to isolated or general conflict, and disrupt SLOCs vital to Japan's survival. Much like China, Japan's changing security concerns indicates a shift in focus from global balances of power, to regional hotspots.⁷⁸

Another indication of the level of change being debated in Japanese strategic circles is the recent report issued by the Prime Minister's Advisory Group on Defense Issues

⁷⁷ Carpenter *A Search for Enemies* 57.

⁷⁸ Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options," *Asian Survey* May 1994: 432-436.

(AGDI). The group's recommendations, published on August 12, 1994, in a Tokyo newspaper, were presented to the Prime Minister, and will be considered in an upcoming review of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline.⁷⁹ Although the group's members were chosen by the previous prime minister, and its suggestions are not likely to be implemented by the new SDP-LDP coalition, the mere fact that such revolutionary proposals could be made by a high-level advisory group attests to the depth of Japan's strategic debate.

The essence of the AGDI report is a recommendation that Japan "move away from a passive defense strategy to a more integrated one in keeping with changes in the geopolitical situation."⁸⁰ The report includes many specific proposals for the SDF, which it argues should be trimmed down to a 240,000-strong, multi-functional, highly mobile force. While the AGDI stresses the importance of continued bilateral security ties to the United States, much of the report seems based on the premise that Japan must change its post-World War Two defense strategy to allow for increased international cooperation on the part of the SDF.

At the core of the group's recommendations for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is the conviction that the fleet should become more balanced. Additionally, the report contends that the Air Self-Defense Forces should reduce its large number of interceptors, and concentrate on refueling, early-warning, and long-range transport aircraft. Finally, on a national scale, the AGDI urges Tokyo to dramatically upgrade its national C3I capabilities, to include spy satellites and an anti-ballistic missile system.⁸¹

⁷⁹ "Panel Urges" *FBIS*.

⁸⁰ "Panel Urges" *FBIS*.

⁸¹ "Panel Urges" *FBIS*.

The depth and substance of this strategic debate suggest that Japanese policy-makers are no longer confident of their security relationship with the United States. This uncertainty may spring from the belief that, without the unifying threat of the Soviet Union, U.S.-Japanese differences on contentious issues--such as trade--will tear the alliance asunder. Despite the popularity of economic liberalism in Japan, another contributor may be a resurgence of realism in the Japanese world view. As a consequence of its renewed involvement in regional affairs, Tokyo may be discovering that Japan has a unique set of national interests, quite distinct from those of the United States. As an important world power and potential regional leader, Japan may not long remain content to rely on the U.S. to defend its vital interests. Moreover, many Japanese believe the U.S. is intentionally trying to "keep Japan a second-rate political and military power," and intends to "impose a Pax Americana in which the United States 'calls the shots' and other countries are forced to follow."⁸² Japan may soon come to the conclusion that only by altering or dissolving its subordinate political-military relationship with the U.S. will it be able to act independently, and in a manner commensurate with its perceived international position.

2. China grows; Japan remains constrained:

Although a resurgent Japan may be beyond the control of the United States, this may be preferable to other alternatives. The astounding economic growth potential of China presents another serious challenge to an American grand strategy rooted in Cold War-era bilateral relationships. Even with only moderate economic growth, China's demographics should give planners cause to take notice. Chalmers Johnson notes:

In 1989, China had a per capita income of \$547, or 2.6 percent of that of the United States; and a total GNP of \$603.5 billion, or 11.6 percent of ours. China's population of 1.1 billion people is more than four times that of the U.S. These numbers mean that China could fairly easily produce an economy the same size as the United States' while still having a relatively

⁸² Carpenter *A Search for Enemies* 65.

*low per capita income. If China achieved a per capita GNP even one-fourth that of the United States--approximately the level of Korea's today--it would have an absolute GNP greater than that of the United States. With the high growth and savings rates achieved in recent years, matching the per capita income of South Korea today is not an unrealistic goal for China.*⁸³

A geo-politically-minded China would most likely endeavor to parlay this economic strength into political and military power as well. Certainly there are many Beijing elites who believe China is the natural leader of Northeast Asia. The authoritarian nature of China's government, and its historical and cultural past, will undoubtedly raise concerns in the region that this leadership could eventually assume hegemonic form. This potential creates dire problems for a U.S. national security strategy that seeks to prevent or counter the growth of a regional hegemon.

Who would balance against a regionally powerful China? Russia is likely to remain weak well into the next century, and though she still possesses a powerful strategic nuclear arsenal, Moscow's ineffective conventional force and lack of regional economic clout makes her value as a balancer questionable. Moreover, Moscow's recent relations with Beijing suggest the beginnings a political and military alignment that could further upset the regional balance. This would leave only Japan, South Korea and the United States to ensure a stable distribution of power. Herein lies the dilemma: constrained by their subordinate political-military relationships with the United States, Japan and Korea would be unable to contribute significantly to the regional balance of power.

In essence, U.S. grand strategy in Northeast Asia has been, and still is a policy of dual containment. In the post-World War II era, the United States endeavored not only to contain the Soviet Union, but also to prevent the resurgence of German and Japanese militarism. Although America is no longer protecting Europe from the Germans, it continues to defend Asia from the Japanese.

⁸³ Chalmers Johnson, "Rethinking Asia," *The National Interest* Summer 1993: 23.

By perpetuating policies that discourage Tokyo from becoming a "normal" great power, the United States is virtually guaranteeing Japan's inability to serve as an effective balancer, and China's ascendancy to regional leadership. Consequently, in the event of a bid for hegemony, or a destabilizing imbalance favoring China, the United States would bear a disproportionate military and political burden to restore equilibrium. In a region characterized by dynamic, modern economies, this is an unnecessary burden, and is not a policy America can afford to maintain.

3. Reunification on the Korean Peninsula:

Finally, the reunification of the Koreas would most likely obviate the need for U.S. troops in that region. While some South Korean officials have already expressed an interest in retaining U.S. forces in Korea following reunification, U.S. defense planners would find it difficult to justify such an action.⁸⁴

The three scenarios discussed above represent situations in which the United States might be forced to rethink its reliance on bilateral security arrangements. But even if Japan does not become a normal power, China does not make a bid for regional hegemony, and the Koreas do not reunify, the United States should closely examine the "fit" of its current grand strategy with the prevailing regional security climate. The bottom-line is that American post-Cold War national security policy more closely reflects the realities of the Cold War than the current era. A grand strategy that is rooted in forward presence and bilateral security arrangements is neither cost-efficient nor sufficiently flexible for contemporary conditions. Furthermore, the addition of the concepts of collective security and democratic enlargement to American security dogma does not update grand strategy, but rather, renders it more problematic.

Thus far this thesis has illustrated the uncertain and dangerous environment that is emerging in Northeast Asia, and argued that current U.S. grand strategy is ill-suited to

⁸⁴ See Victor Fic, "U.S. Presence In the Asia-Pacific: New Role?" *Asian Defence Journal* Sept. 1993: 17.

serve America's regional security interests. The balance of this thesis examines the political, military, and economic aspects of an alternative grand strategy for Northeast Asia, as well as the special problems presented by Japan, and possible solutions.

V. THE DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF GRAND STRATEGY

"He who attempts to defend too much defends nothing." Frederick the Great

The role of foreign policy is crucial to a complete grand strategy. In fact, a grand strategy, if applied effectively, "alleviates any need for violence."⁸⁵ In a world of decreasing military budgets and increasing international economic competition, diplomacy plays a vital role by managing trade, easing tensions, responding to crises, ending conflict, and shaping the character of the international environment in which national strategy must operate. As the Japanese and Russians have discovered, security is not simply military, but has political and economic dimensions that, if neglected, will surely bring about the failure of any grand design.

The fundamental objective of foreign policy in a grand strategy of selective engagement is twofold. First, diplomacy would strive to shape the international strategic environment by keeping the United States actively engaged in world politics. Second, foreign policy would endeavor to maintain geo-political balances that would ensure stability in the world marketplace and create a climate in which progress can be made toward the betterment of the human condition.

To best facilitate America's national security interests in a region characterized by tension and uncertainty, U.S. foreign policy needs a strategic rationale. Charles William Maynes, editor of *Foreign Policy*, argues that U.S. leadership needs a "geopolitical yardstick" to act as guide and midpoint for a post-Cold War foreign policy that is pulled between the extremes of global preeminence and traditional isolationism.⁸⁶ In order to construct this yardstick, U.S. planners must first identify U.S. interests, and then

⁸⁵ Collins 15.

⁸⁶ "A Workable Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy* Winter 1993-94: 6.

formulate objectives that will operationalize these abstractions. In Chapter II, this thesis examined U.S. security interests, and determined that America's most important objectives in Northeast Asia were the maintenance of stability, and the forestallment of regional hegemons. This chapter argues that the diplomatic aspects of post-Cold War grand strategy can best serve U.S. security interests and objectives through three tactics: first, by de-emphasizing binding bilateral security arrangements; second, by placing America in the position of engaged balancer and grand facilitator; and third, by encouraging a gradual shift of Northeast Asian security responsibilities to Asia. Fundamental to these approaches is an underlying belief that geo-politics and the balance of power still matter in Northeast Asia.

A. A PREMATURE FUNERAL FOR GEO-POLITICS

Whether a realist international system, in which balances of power operate, still exists is a matter of heated contemporary debate. "A number of lines of thought now converge to suggest that the relationships among the major powers have entered an entirely new phase in which, contrary to all past experience and to the logic of the anarchic international system as it has been generally understood, war is no longer an option for those powers in their relations with one another."⁸⁷ James Richardson in his essay, "The End of Geopolitics?," summarizes some of the arguments typically advanced in support of this perspective. First, an increase in the number of democratic states has lessened the possibility of war because democracies are less likely to use military force against one another. Second, the new form of global economic interdependence is of a different order than the old interdependence which failed to prevent major war. Third, great powers no longer engage in geopolitical rivalries, but instead are required to cooperate in order to

⁸⁷ James L. Richardson, "The End of Geopolitics?," *Charting the Post-Cold War Order*, eds. Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder: Westview, 1993) 40.

maintain the complex global economy. Fourth, there has been a secular change of attitudes in the democratic societies amounting to a rejection of major war (non-nuclear) as an instrument of policy.⁸⁸

Though not without merit, the arguments in support of the liberal paradigm are not entirely convincing when viewed in the context of Northeast Asia. First, the notion of democratic peace does not provide much reassurance in a region with only one stable democracy--Japan. While Russia is presently experimenting with democratic institutions, the tumultuous domestic situation could eventually produce a decidedly non-democratic government. Even South Korea, which for now appears to be on the road to real democracy, could revert to more authoritarian forms if pressed with the enormous task of reconstructing the North.⁸⁹

The second argument for the demise of geo-politics runs into similar trouble in Northeast Asia. As discussed in Chapter III, economic interdependence in the region is not comparable to the sort of interdependence evident in Western Europe and North America. Economic interdependence in Northeast Asia has not only failed to keep pace with the European Union, but it also varies greatly within the region, and even within individual states. Moreover, there is little historical evidence to support the proposition that economic interdependence can ameliorate tension and conflict.⁹⁰

The third argument--that states must now cooperate to maintain the complex global economy, and therefore no longer engage in geo-political rivalries--holds some truth, but is not entirely acceptable. Indeed the world economy, and that of Northeast Asia, is complex, and cooperation among states contributes to its efficient operation. President

⁸⁸ Richardson "The End of Geopolitics?" 40.

⁸⁹ Edward A. Olsen, lecture, Security in Asia Seminar, Naval Postgraduate School, 24 Oct. 1994.

⁹⁰ Buzan and Segal 12-14.

Clinton's de-linking of human rights and Most Favored Nation trade status may be one example of this type of accordance. Sovereign states, however, do not always agree on the proper course of action in regard to international economics. Just as groups within states differ on policy, states within a system can arrive at diametrically opposed positions, even when their interests coincide. These differences, particularly during periods of economic stress, could lead to tension, and even conflict.

Additionally, there is no reason to believe that cooperation for the sake of mutual economic benefit rules out geo-political maneuvering. Trade cooperation between the United States and China continued throughout the Bush Administration, despite the conviction held in Beijing that America was attempting to impose its hegemony on the post-Cold War world.⁹¹ Not surprisingly, China has continued to act geo-politically, as its military cooperation with Russia and proclamations regarding maritime territories demonstrate.

Finally, there is insufficient empirical evidence that modern societies have rejected major war (non-nuclear) as an instrument of policy. Although this argument may hold some validity for Japan, it is probably not sound in regard to China, Russia or the Koreas. Even the modern, well-informed citizens of the United States were overwhelmingly prepared to spend thousands of American lives to restore the Emir of Kuwait, and safeguard oil primarily destined for Japan and Europe.

The revolutionary changes beginning to appear in the political landscape of Western Europe give credence to the optimism of post-modern liberalism. The realities of Northeast Asia, however, suggest that it may be premature to dance on the grave of geo-politics. Even those who herald the demise of balance of power politics among the "core" states (meaning Europe, North America and Japan) harbor reservations about international relations in the "periphery." Richardson qualifies his hypothesis:

⁹¹ Shambaugh "Growing Strong" 49-50.

*The end of geopolitics, then--taking this to mean the end of war among the leading powers and of arming themselves against one another--is plausible as a projection of the next phase of international politics. However, a challenge to the dominant order by a major 'have-not' power cannot be entirely ruled out, even though this is more easily envisaged in regional terms than in global terms--and China is the power most likely to be in a position to mount such a challenge.*⁹²

B. THE BALANCE OF POWER

If geo-politics are not dead in Northeast Asia, then American grand strategy should contain diplomatic elements that recognize and accommodate for these realities. Although U.S. grand strategy should not abandon the hope of achieving Northeast Asian security objectives through more liberal methods--such as the expansion of democracy and free market economies, and the institutionalization of multilateral security cooperation--its foundation should be rooted in the clay of "existential realism."⁹³ Accepting this reality, one of the most cost-effective diplomatic methods through which the United States can achieve its national security objectives is the maintenance of a regional balance of power.

The balance of power has come to represent the primary diplomatic strategy of states in a realist geo-political system. Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, David Hume argued that man had been thinking in terms of the balance of power since at *least* the times of Thucydides, and asserted, "the maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much in common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could have altogether escaped antiquity. . . ." More modern elucidations on the merits of this

⁹² "The End of Geopolitics?" 42.

⁹³ Term and concept borrowed from Robert J. Lieber, "Existential Realism After the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly* Winter 1993:155-168.

concept have been penned by such giants in the field of international relations as Hans Morgenthau, Inis Claude, and Henry Kissinger.

The fundamental precept of the balance of power theory is that states, which are the primary actors in any realist paradigm, will seek cooperative arrangements with other states to safeguard or advance their interests vis-a-vis an opposing state or alignment. "The safety of all was assured only if no one nation or group of nations was permitted to achieve a preponderance of power. . . whenever the system threatened to break down, a 'balancer' would ally itself with the weaker group of nations and thus restore the unstable equilibrium known as the 'balance of power.'"⁹⁴

Stephen Walt, in "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," examines the most central debate concerning the paradigm's theoretical soundness:

*When entering an alliance, states may either balance (ally in opposition to the principle source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses the major threat). These contrasting hypotheses depict very different worlds, and the policies that follow from each are equally distinct. In the simplest terms, if balancing is more common than bandwagoning, then states are more secure because aggressors will face combined opposition. Status quo states should therefore avoid provoking countervailing coalitions by eschewing threatening foreign and defense policies. But if bandwagoning is the dominant tendency, then security is scarce because aggression is rewarded. A more belligerent foreign policy and a more capable military establishment are the logical policy choices.*⁹⁵

Walt goes on to make a convincing argument that, despite some notable exceptions rooted in factors such as perceived threat, proximity, and ideology, balancing is the prevalent reaction in international alliance-building.

⁹⁴ John G. Stoessinger, *The Might of Nations: World Politics in Our Time*, 8th ed. (New York: Random House, 1986) 24.

⁹⁵ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* Spring 1985: 4-5.

Another prominent thinker in the field of international relations, Morton Kaplan, maintains that a balance of power operates by several essential rules, which constitute the characteristic behavior of the system. These rules include:

- *oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of predominance within the system;*
- *permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners, or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification; and*
- *treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.*⁹⁶

Viewed in the context of post-Cold war Northeast Asia, these "rules" can provide direction for a U.S. diplomacy that acknowledges existential realism. First, the political elements of U.S. grand strategy should focus on maintaining a power equilibrium by opposing nations that seek predominance. Though many observers would immediately point to the threat from China, it is not yet evident that Beijing wishes to impose its hegemony on Northeast Asia. U.S. policy-makers should also guard against letting ideological affinity cloud strategic judgment when faced with hegemonic ambition. American diplomacy should be just as ready to balance against a dominating Japan or Russia. Winston Churchill's words illustrate this point:

*The policy of England takes no account of which nation it is that seeks the overlordship of Europe. It is concerned solely with whoever is the strongest or the potentially dominating tyrant. It is a law of public policy which we are following, and not a mere expedient dictated by accidental circumstances of likes and dislikes. . .*⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Morton A. Kaplan, "Some Problems of International Systems Research," *Classics of International Relations*, ed. John A. Vasquez (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1986) 286.

⁹⁷ Quoted in Henry A. Kissinger, "Balance of Power Sustained," *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*, eds. Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992) 242.

Second, U.S. foreign policy should work to facilitate the reentry of Russia, the heir to the defeated Soviet Union, into the regional power balance. By encouraging the rebuilding of effective government in Russia, and allowing that state to participate as a full partner in the international system, the United States would serve its Northeast Asian security interests by contributing to regional equilibrium. Similarly, American diplomacy should work toward the integration of both North and South Korea--and someday a unified Korea-- into the Northeast Asian balance as full partners, rather than the junior partners of the great powers. It is very possible that Korea may one day play a pivotal role in the regional balance of power. In fact, Chalmers Johnson refers to Korea, along with Vietnam, as the "most important buffer states in East Asia."⁹⁸

Finally, American foreign policy should regard all of Northeast Asia's essential actors as acceptable role partners: North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and most importantly, China. While U.S. anti-China rhetoric has cooled somewhat, American proclamations and policies elsewhere in Asia continue to give the impression of a nation locked in an ideological duel. America cannot afford to isolate or contain China, nor should it try. "To put it bluntly, with some 22 percent of the world's population, a seat on the U.N. Security Council, a nuclear and missile arsenal with global reach, and, by some measures, the world's third largest economy, if China is not integrated into a post-Cold War system, a viable international system will not exist."⁹⁹ A stable and effective China would play a crucial role in a healthy Northeast Asian balance of power; a weak China "could once again become an object of international competition and stimulate rivalries that would make regional cooperation an idle dream."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ "Rethinking Asia" 27.

⁹⁹ Robert Manning, "Clinton and China: Beyond Human Rights," *Orbis* Spring 1994: 200.

¹⁰⁰ Bryce Harland, "For A Strong China," *Foreign Policy* Spring 1994: 51.

With these general directions suggested by balance of power theory in mind, specific national security roles for U.S. diplomacy in post-Cold War Northeast Asia can now be examined.

C. TOWARD MORE FLEXIBLE ARRANGEMENTS

The collection of bilateral arrangements that has characterized American security policy in post-World War II Northeast Asia has served U.S. interests well. Particularly in Northeast Asia, where security treaties with Japan and South Korea have dominated the political landscape, these bilateral arrangements have enabled the United States not only to contain Soviet expansionism, but also to spread American ideals and structures, thereby creating an Asia-Pacific environment favorable to its interests. The Cold War and the circumstances that created it, however, are no more. In spite of these monumental changes, U.S. security policy seems intent on allowing inertia to carry it into the twenty-first century.

Whereas the conditions that spawned containment required a structure of rigid bilateral security pacts, the evolving nature of post-Cold War Northeast Asia may be better served through more flexible arrangements. As discussed in Chapter IV, regional events such as Japan's transition to normal power status, China's continued growth, or the reunification of Korea may force an end to current security relationships. Additionally, an overly ambitious diplomatic agenda and pressing domestic concerns in the United States could result in a rising nostalgia for traditional American isolationism. These possibilities should alert U.S. strategic planners to the need to begin searching for alternative practices.

By gradually transforming America's rigid security relationships with Japan and Korea into less binding arrangements, the United States could give itself more latitude to maneuver in a balance of power environment, while preventing the instability that might result from a hastily unleashed Japan (the Japan issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter

VI). This process would allow the United States to progress from its expensive and exhausting role as protector of Northeast Asian stability to that of a participant in the regional balance of power.

D. AMERICA AS BALANCER AND GRAND FACILITATOR

Rather than responding to perceived threats to U.S. strategic interests within the framework of America's Cold War security arrangements, the diplomacy of a grand strategy of selective engagement would allow more latitude. By first clearly identifying U.S. security interests, and then examining each threat to those interests on an *ad hoc* basis, the United States would, in effect, be applying a policy of selective engagement.

Andrew Goldberg argues that selective engagement is not new to American foreign policy, and is in many ways similar to the nineteenth century policies of Great Britain, another maritime power. Goldberg describes the historical attributes of such a policy:

*The first characteristic of selective engagement was to rely upon and if possible nurture a relatively equal balance of power among other states. The second was the avoidance of permanent military commitments on other continents. The third was an emphasis on maritime strength and eventually air power to provide comparative military advantage and freedom of action in the event of hostilities.*¹⁰¹

Accordingly, a U.S. security policy employing the principles of selective engagement would contain three key elements: first, U.S. foreign policy would seek to nurture a relative balance of power among the major states of Eurasia. Second, while embracing international organizations and coalitions whenever possible, the United States would eschew most permanent military commitments in favor of more flexible arrangements. Finally, America would not try to persuade others to rely on U.S. military

¹⁰¹ "Selective Engagement" 18.

preponderance as an alternative to expansion of their own capabilities, and instead would "accept the reality of emerging new military powers."¹⁰²

The flexibility provided by selective engagement may not only prove to be desirable in post-Cold War Northeast Asia, it may also prove inevitable. "A United States that is undergoing an economic revolution will be unwilling to pay the price for extensive unilateral action and the prospects for consensual action will be modest in the near future."¹⁰³ Selective engagement allows America to remain engaged in Northeast Asia as an active participant, shaping the regional security environment, but in a more cost-effective manner than is possible with Cold War-era policies.

Alberto Coll, in his 1992 article for *Foreign Affairs*, "America as the Grand Facilitator," suggests that a principal aim of U.S. foreign and defense policies in the post-Cold War era should be to "maintain a global balance of power and regional balances of power favorable to the United States and its allies."¹⁰⁴ To accomplish this goal, Coll argues that the most appropriate diplomatic strategy for the United States is to act as a "grand facilitator" of the existing international order. This role would require that America help maintain global and regional balances of power, and serve as benevolent arbiter or mediator in regions critical to its national interests.¹⁰⁵

Rather than carrying on its shoulders, Atlas-like, the entire burden of containing local hegemony, the United States should play a role of 'holder of the balance' akin to that played by Great Britain during much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For the foreseeable future, the United States will have the geographical security, political prestige, and military

¹⁰² Goldberg "Selective Engagement" 16.

¹⁰³ Goldberg "Selective Engagement" 21.

¹⁰⁴ *Foreign Affairs* Spring 1992: 51.

¹⁰⁵ Coll "Grand Facilitator" 56.

*power to organize and lead coalition-building efforts geared to check the expansionists tendencies of local powers in specific regions.*¹⁰⁶

Moreover, Coll contends that the "distinguishing mark of a grand facilitator is its ability to relate its national interests to the interests of other states and the larger purposes of international society."

Maintaining regional balances of power will require a foreign policy that complements existing alliances with a set of "flexible alliances" or "shifting coalitions" through which the United States would enter into temporary cooperative political and military arrangements with states that share its goals in a particular region.¹⁰⁷ Coll acknowledges that such a diplomatic strategy will be difficult to implement, and will "require large doses of patience and skill."

Separate from balance of power considerations, another component of U.S. diplomatic strategy would be, in words Coll attributes to Paul Nitze, that of "honest broker." In this role the United States would actively engage in "mediating regional disputes and conflicts to help resolve them in ways that further America's larger international objectives." Coll argues that the United States is uniquely suited for the role of benevolent arbiter because of its "geographic isolation, its historic aversion to wars of conquest, its character as a democratic, pluralistic society of immigrants of all faiths and nationalities, and the relative success of its economic and political system" which give it greater universal appeal and credibility than any other nation. As the benevolent arbiter in Northeast Asia, the United States could take advantage of its economic and military leverage to "moderate security anxieties, restrain destabilizing arms races, and channel economic competition for the common good."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Coll "Grand Facilitator" 55.

¹⁰⁷ Coll "Grand Facilitator" 55.

¹⁰⁸ Coll "Grand Facilitator" 56.

In post-Cold War Northeast Asia, a U.S. security policy based on the concept of selective engagement would cast America in the role of grand facilitator, honest broker and engaged balancer. By performing these roles, American diplomacy would serve U.S. interests by maintaining a stable and effective regional political and economic structure. As grand facilitator and honest broker, the United States might find itself conducting negotiations on Korean unification, not from the position of South Korea's protector, but from the vantage of a impartial third party seeking the greater good. As balancer, the chief concern of the United States would not be to create a perfect equilibrium of forces, or to ensure that one nation is stronger than another, but rather to guard against the unfolding of destabilizing imbalances. Through a flexible policy of loose alignment and *ad hoc* coalition-building, the United States could use its considerable political, military, and economic weight to correct dangerous imbalances, thereby restoring stability and protecting American security interests.

E. SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY TO ASIA

In light of the geo-political realities of post-Cold War Northeast Asia, the United States may now be shouldering too much of the burden for regional stability:

America's strategy of extended deterrence, then, has not changed much since the collapse of the Soviet Union: The United States takes extraordinary responsibility for Asia's stability--while paying much less attention to the foundations of its own power. Japan, or, for that matter, any other country of East Asia, takes little more responsibility for regional security than it did during the Cold War. It is clearly time for a change.¹⁰⁹

The diplomatic aspects of a grand strategy of selective engagement would allow the United States to begin shifting more responsibility for regional security to Asian nations.

¹⁰⁹ Ellings and Olsen 127.

As discussed in Chapter III, Northeast Asia is an uncertain and potentially dangerous region. The answer to America's security concerns, however, is not to unilaterally provide regional security into perpetuity. By contributing to the Northeast Asian equilibrium in the role of engaged balancer, the United States can serve its most important regional objective--maintaining regional stability--and retain the flexibility to act either unilaterally, or in concert with temporary partners, on other issues. Particularly well suited for the role of balancer, the United States would remain actively engaged in Northeast Asia without the responsibilities of a unilateral defender of the peace.¹¹⁰ "By remaining engaged, Washington will retain vital leverage with Japan, China, and others in the region's rough-and-tumble balance-of-power politics."¹¹¹

The cultivation of a stable regional equilibrium would permit the United States to gradually assume a relatively smaller role in Northeast Asian security without sacrificing important security objectives. Rather than expend diplomatic energies trying to meet every challenge to America's preeminence, U.S. foreign policy would harness the inherent dynamics of a balance of power system, by encouraging and facilitating balancing behavior, to serve its security needs. Recognizing that the emergence of regional great powers is inevitable, American diplomacy would endeavor to adjust to, and compensate for, changes in equilibrium.

Herein lies a dilemma. U.S. grand strategy throughout the Cold War embraced a necessary dichotomy: containment was meant not only to restrain Soviet expansionism, but also to ensure the continued non-belligerence of Germany and Japan. Today, nearly fifty years after the defeat of Imperial Japan, U.S. security policy is still guided by the "ghosts of World War II."¹¹²

¹¹⁰ See Coll "Grand Facilitator" 47-65, and Maynes "A Workable Clinton Doctrine" 3-20.

¹¹¹ Ellings and Olsen 130.

¹¹² Carpenter *A Search for Enemies* 69.

The East Asian fear of a resurgent Japan cannot be discounted. Whether real or imagined, many regional policy-makers would perceive a fully independent Japan to be a threat to their states' security. This perception could prompt regional actors to react in a manner inconsistent with normal balancing, thus creating instability and conditions prejudicial to U.S. security interests.

Although the political, military and economic elements of a grand strategy of selective engagement are predicated on the assumption that Japan will eventually function as a full partner in the regional balance of power, a Japan-inspired security dilemma and the resulting instability, would render those policies self-defeating. Accordingly, a central question facing U.S. post-Cold War grand strategy in Northeast Asia is how to facilitate an expansion of Japan's role without setting off a regional arms race. This dilemma is the subject of the next chapter.

VI. MAKING JAPAN A "NORMAL COUNTRY:" THE U.S. ROLE

The dilemma posed by Japan requires that the United States take an active role in ushering Japan onto the world stage as a leading character. Particularly crucial is that Japan assume its rightful place in the Northeast Asian regional structure and as a fully fledged partner in the regional balance of power. This chapter first examines what motivates Japan, and how Tokyo plans to achieve its objectives. Next, it explores the U.S.-Japan security relationship, and how it should evolve to compensate for the new realities of post-Cold War Northeast Asia. Similarly, it discusses the promise of multilateralism, and what might result from the creation of a regional architecture for security dialogue.

A. JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICIES IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

Following Japan's defeat in World War II, the U.S. occupation government set out to ensure that Japan would never again pose a threat to regional or global security. The destruction of the Japanese military as a domestic political actor, and the construction of the 1947 Peace Constitution were essential elements in that process. With the "loss" of Nationalist China in 1949, and the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 America found reason to shift its position on Japanese rearmament.¹¹³ Under the leadership of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Japan resisted U.S. pressure to remilitarize, but did agree to the security treaties of 1951 and 1960. In return for granting the United States the right to station troops in Japan, Yoshida gained a U.S. security guarantee without having to

¹¹³ David Arase. "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," *Contemporary Security Policy* August 1994: 44.

make any reciprocal or third-party commitments.¹¹⁴ Shielded by American arms, Japan avoided contentious international issues, and focused its national energies on economic pursuits. Dubbed the Yoshida Doctrine, this strategy would remain at the core of Japanese security policy for the next four decades.¹¹⁵

Responding to U.S. demands in the early 1980s for defense burden-sharing, Japan began to modify its passive stance on national security. Militarily, Tokyo agreed to a larger role in its own defense, and assumed responsibility for sea lane defense out to 1000 nautical miles from Japan. Restrained by domestic opinion, Tokyo was still prevented from explicitly committing the JSDF to anything but local defense of the Japanese homeland. "To broaden its contributions to Western security, Japan began to portray economic assistance as a security contribution."¹¹⁶

Mounting pressure from the United States on Tokyo to increase its level of burden-sharing resulted in no real changes in Japanese defense policy, but did prompt Japan to name and "doctrinalize" what it had been doing all along. Tokyo's concept of *sogo anzen hosho* (comprehensive security) is a label developed in the early 1980s, and is described by Edward Olsen in this way:

The doctrine declares that the Japanese consider security to be broadly defined to include its economic and political components, not exclusively or primarily its military facets. The doctrine further emphasizes that Japan shall focus on the nonmilitary portions of comprehensive security where it has cultivated significant assets in the post-World War II period, and minimize its military contributions to security in keeping with constraints imposed by Article Nine of its postwar constitution and with the sentiments of the Japanese people who are reluctant to become entangled in collective security. To its protagonists this doctrine reflects an equitable distribution

¹¹⁴ Arase "New Directions" 44.

¹¹⁵ Eugene Brown, *Japan's Search for Strategic Vision: The Contemporary Debate* (Carlisle Barracks: SSI, 1993) 1.

¹¹⁶ Arase "New Directions" 45.

*of burdens in which Japan undertakes what it is most suited to perform and the United States upholds its interests on the military security front where it enjoys many comparative advantages.*¹¹⁷

Framed by the Peace Constitution, the Yoshida Doctrine, and the concept of comprehensive security, Japanese security policy in the postwar period remained decidedly non-international. The end of the Cold War, and Japan's meteoric rise to the status of a great economic power, however, began to stir internal, as well as external debate concerning Tokyo's proper role in regional and international politics. Spurred on by the Gulf War, Japan now wrestles with a contentious debate about the future of her foreign and national security policies.

B. JAPAN PREPARES TO TAKE THE STAGE

Chalmers Johnson writes: "Japan's agenda for the next decade is to resume responsibility for its own foreign policy and to begin to shape the world in which it lives rather than simply adjusting to it."¹¹⁸ Brian Bridges, in his monograph *Japan: Hesitant Superpower*, contends that Japanese elites now realize that "the passive, essentially reactive, foreign policy of the past four decades or so is no longer feasible in the more complex post-Cold war environment."¹¹⁹ Eugene Brown maintains:

There is currently underway at elite levels a thoughtful dialogue over such fundamental matters as the nature of Japanese interests, potential threats to those interests, and the requisite measures to counter those threats. Lending urgency to the dialogue are two external factors that together

¹¹⁷ Edward A. Olsen, "Korean Security: Is Japan's 'Comprehensive Security' Model a Viable Alternative?", *The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change*, eds. Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1992) 141-142.

¹¹⁸ "Japan in Search" 21.

¹¹⁹ Conflict Studies # 264, RISCT, 1993: 1.

*challenge virtually the entire foundation of Japan's postwar international stance: the demise of the Cold War and the perceived relative decline of the United States. Occurring separately, either phenomenon would trigger a broad rethinking of Japan's international posture. Occurring nearly simultaneously, they have called into question the core axioms that have guided Japanese foreign policy since 1945.*¹²⁰

The end of the Cold War is not the only factor behind Japan's strategic debate: "There is a rough consensus among the Japanese today, based upon the experience of the Gulf crisis, that Japan should assume a larger responsibility and play a more active role in the world."¹²¹ Okawara Yoshio adds that while public opinion polls clearly show a consensus on the need to change, no one has yet devised a grand strategy for Japan's global vision.¹²²

During the Cold War, Japan's national security policy took on primarily economic dimensions. "Japanese interests in this environment were clear: economic reconstruction, international political rehabilitation, and ensuring national security."¹²³ Japanese leaders adopted a two-pronged strategy to meet these interests:

*(1) to concentrate on expanding foreign markets for Japanese exports to foster economic development, while nurturing Japanese industries and gaining control over high-value-added technologies critical to Japanese industrial competitiveness; and (2) to minimize military expenditures and maintain a low political profile, relying on the United States to guarantee Japan's external security.*¹²⁴

¹²⁰ Brown "Japanese Security Policy" 430.

¹²¹ Okawara Yoshio, "Japan's Global Responsibilities," *Japan's Emerging Global Role*, eds. Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993) 57.

¹²² "Japan's Global Responsibilities" 57

¹²³ Norman D. Levin, "Prospects for U.S.-Japanese Security Cooperation," *Japan's Emerging Global Role*, 72.

¹²⁴ Levin "Prospects" 72.

A variety of domestic and international factors now motivate Japan to formulate more independent foreign and national security policies. Inoguchi Takashi, in his article "Japan's Role in International Affairs," suggests at least six factors that have influenced Japanese decision-making. First, the rapid growth of Japan's economy to proportions overshadowed only by that of the United States mandates that Japan assume a commensurate position in international politics. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union may have ended America's domestic justification for maintaining an active political and military presence in Northeast Asia. Without this justification, many Japanese are certain that pressures within the United States to find solutions to domestic ills will eventually result in a major retrenchment. Similarly, the perception that America has entered an irreversible state of relative economic and political decline suggests that Japan will have to fill the void left by a receding U.S. presence. Third, the end of the Cold War has swept away the bipolar international structure, and in its place a multipolar system has taken shape. Inoguchi postulates that in a multipolar system the influence of the superpower(s) will decline, and that of the major powers, including Japan, will increase. Fourth, Inoguchi contends that "with the demise of the Soviet military threat, military power is not as important in international affairs as it once was."¹²⁵ Accordingly, Japan, which is primarily an economic power, should have more leverage and play a more important role than during the previous era. Fifth, the failure of America's political leadership to revitalize U.S. industrial and financial sectors has left Japan--with its high savings rate and large trade surplus--as "virtually the only country that can afford to underwrite large-scale international public policy actions."¹²⁶ Finally, Japan's export-oriented economy and high levels of direct investment overseas has "embedded Japan even more deeply in the

¹²⁵ Inoguchi Takashi. "Japan's Role in International Affairs," *Survival* Summer 1992: 73.

¹²⁶ Inoguchi "Japan's Role" 73.

international economic system, giving it a wide range of international economic interests," and ensuring that Japan has a keen awareness of international affairs.¹²⁷

Japan's strategic debate is characterized by several key issues. Eugene Brown in his monograph, *Japan's Search for Strategic Vision*, contends that:

*... the debate centers on which axis is most crucial to Japan's future: the bilateral axis linking Japan in a global partnership with the United States or the regional axis linking Japan with the rest of Asia. The two paradigms are not, of course, mutually exclusive. It is axiomatic that both its trans-Pacific ties to the United States and its regional links with the rest of Asia will constitute Japan's principal external interests in the coming decades. It is also the case, however, that among Japanese opinion elites there is a competition under way over which of the two paradigms should lie at the heart of Japan's nascent effort to construct a coherent foreign policy strategy.*¹²⁸

Furthermore, Brown asserts that Japan has four broad strategic options. Though these options are not mutually exclusive, the "debate involves the relative efficacy of, and priority to be accorded to the four approaches." They include: unilateral enhancement of the capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces; participation and increased reliance on international and multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations; construction of an East Asian regional security architecture; and continued bilateral security ties with the United States.¹²⁹

Chalmers Johnson argues that there are three obstacles along Japan's path to a "normal" role. First, Japan must change its neo-mercantilistic economic policies--and the predatory business practices they condone--in order to make progress on other issues. Second, Japan must decide how to handle its bilateral security relationship with a United

¹²⁷ Inoguchi "Japan's Role" 72.

¹²⁸ Brown "Japan's Search" 8.

¹²⁹ Brown "Japanese Security Policy" 438.

States it perceives as being in decline. Third, Japan must find a way to overcome its World War II legacy, reconcile with its neighbors, and assume a well-rounded leadership role in Asia.¹³⁰

Japan's Peace Constitution adds another layer of complexity to the ongoing strategic debate. Ozawa Ichiro, the power behind the last two Japanese governments, "would like to cut through the constitutional tangle by scrapping article nine altogether."¹³¹ At present, this has little popular support--as little as seven percent according to an opinion poll in January 1994.¹³² This type of drastic action, however, is probably not necessary. Although many Japanese argue that the Constitution prohibits any expansion of Japan's security role, the reality is that the government has the flexibility to interpret the Constitution as it sees fit to serve national security as long as there is a consensus among the political *habatsu* that is accepted by the Japanese public.¹³³

Neither General MacArthur nor Prime Minister Yoshida believed that the inherent right of self-defense was unconstitutional, and their opinions were affirmed in 1959, when Japan's Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution "in no way denies the right of self-defense," and deferred future interpretations of the document to the Japanese government.¹³⁴ "Consequently, the type of military equipment and role the Japanese Self-Defense Forces should play has been decided by the government in an incremental way,

¹³⁰ Johnson "Japan in Search" 6.

¹³¹ "All dressed up and nowhere to go," *The Economist* 18 June 1994: 38.

¹³² "All dressed up" 38.

¹³³ James R. Van de Velde, "Article Nine of the Postwar Japanese Constitution," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* Spring 1987: 26.

¹³⁴ Quoted in Mark T. Staples, "United States-Japanese National Interests in Asia: Security in the 1990s," Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 1989: 112.

building a national consensus on security policy."¹³⁵

Over time, the Peace Constitution has been interpreted so as to allow the SDF to possess various weapons systems, and to legitimize the deployment of Japanese forces outside territorial limits. Because the Japanese government, with elite consensus and public support, is free to interpret the Constitution in a manner that would allow for a more active or aggressive military posture, this contingency should not be discounted because of Western notions of unconstitutionality.¹³⁶

The points raised by Brown, Johnson, Staples and Van der Velde suggest a strategic debate in Japan that is far from resolved. Herein lies the role of the United States: by applying influence and leverage to Japan's loci of strategic decision-making, America can coax Tokyo in a direction that will facilitate her acceptance onto the Northeast Asian stage as a "normal country," and in the process, enhance U.S. interests in the region by enabling the transition to a grand strategy of selective engagement. The U.S. can expedite Japan's acceptance in two ways: first, by effectively managing the transformation of the U.S.-Japan security relationship and the concurrent expansion of Japan's indigenous security mechanisms; and second, by enmeshing Japan into appropriate multilateral economic and security regimes.

C. TRANSFORMING THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

U.S. national security policy should encourage Japan to continue on the road to greater strategic independence. Although it may be that "regardless of what Americans do, Japanese momentum in much of the LDP, the business community, the intelligentsia,

¹³⁵ Staples "Security in the 1990s" 112.

¹³⁶ Van der Velde "Article Nine" 41.

journalism, and the bureaucracy is toward greater independence from the United States,"¹³⁷ it is imperative that U.S. grand strategy remain engaged in order to exert an influence on the outcome.

The United States should also ensure that Japan's transition to major power status occurs gradually. While the emergence of Japan as a full partner in the Northeast Asian balance of power can have a stabilizing effect, a rapid alteration of the regional equilibrium would, by definition, create instability. By encouraging an incremental transformation of Japanese security policy, the U.S. can provide time for Tokyo to work out its differences with other regional actors, as well as allow Japanese leaders the time "to build the necessary domestic support to expand Japan's independent defense capabilities along the lines that former prime minister Nakasone proposed in the mid-1980s."¹³⁸

Structural realism notwithstanding, an independent Japanese security policy is bound to reflect the unique characteristics and preferences of Japanese society. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara write in "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," that Japan's national security policy has two distinctive aspects that deserve analysis:

*First, Japan's definition of national security goes far beyond traditional military notions. National security is viewed in comprehensive terms that also include economic and political dimensions. The second feature of Japan's security policy worth explanation is a distinctive mixture of flexibility and rigidity in the process of policy adaption to change: flexibility on issues of economic security, rigidity on issues of military security, and flexibility combined with rigidity on issues of political security.*¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Johnson "Japan in Search" 6.

¹³⁸ Johnson "Japan in Search" 6.

¹³⁹ *International Security* Spring 1993: 84.

Katzenstein and Okawara conclude that Japan's security policy is not determined by international structures, but rather by "the structure of the state broadly conceived and the incentives it provides for policy on the one hand, and on the other by the context of social and legal norms that help define policy interests and the standards of appropriateness for specific policy choices."¹⁴⁰ This conclusion leads the authors to speculate that post-Cold War Japan, if given a choice, will make a simultaneous choice for growing economic involvement with Asia and a continued, if altered, security relationship with the United States.

Tokyo's preference for a security policy heavily weighted in favor of economic or political strategies is an inevitable outgrowth of its postwar bias against military solutions and should not be a source of concern for U.S. strategic planners. A militarily defensive Japan, espousing the virtues of economic liberalism is perfectly compatible with the Northeast Asian structure, despite the realist world views and geo-political grand strategies of China and Russia.

The mission of U.S. diplomacy should be to encourage Tokyo to assume a greater responsibility for Northeast Asian security through its preferred methods of economic and political activism, while assuring other regional actors that America's ultimate goal is a stable and effective balance of power in which no state seeks hegemony. Concurrently, U.S. policy should be structured so as to bring about a gradual weaning of Japan from dependence on U.S. military security guarantees. By pursuing these policies with the full cognizance of the international and regional community, the U.S. and Japan can conduct an important transition without creating disequilibrium, uncertainty, or a security dilemma.

As an political and economic great power, with the ability to defend itself and its immediate sea lanes, Japan would serve as an effective player in a regional balance of power. Militarily, Japan is well suited for its preferred defensive role for several reasons.

¹⁴⁰ "Japan's National Security" 86.

First, Japan is an insular nation and maritime power. Although China has begun to recognize and protect its maritime interests, its strategic center-of-gravity, like that of Russia, remains continental, and thus highly resistant to purely maritime force. Conversely, Japan's strategic center is maritime, and not particularly vulnerable to a predominantly continental power.¹⁴¹ While China and Russia may eventually float impressive fleets with far more ability to project power onto land than past armadas, Japan's insular geography and superior technology means that she would only have to deploy a modest navy to preserve the military balance.

Moreover, an unprovoked or inordinate naval expansion by either China or Russia would not only justify a Japanese response, but would probably incite the United States to act in its role as engaged balancer, and throw its maritime weight in with Japan. This action would either reestablish equilibrium and preserve the peace, or if conflict resulted, place the United States in a position of strategic advantage.

Japan's two most acute military vulnerabilities--her lack of indigenous resources, and concentrated population--could be compensated for with non-threatening military solutions. First, Japan's resource supply-line, which moves entirely by maritime air and sea routes are amenable to protection by her substantial naval forces. In particular, Japan's technologically advanced anti-air, anti-mine and anti-submarine forces would be indispensable in the protection of her maritime links to the world. Second, Japan's concentrated population could be given some protection against airborne weapons by constructing a modest ballistic and cruise missile defense system. Modeled along the lines of U.S. theater missile defense systems currently under development, a Japanese version could utilize existing sea-based Aegis and airborne intercept technology, as well as next generation land-based tracking and counter-measures.

¹⁴¹ Concept of strategic centers of gravity borrowed from Colin Gray, *The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War* (New York: Free Press, 1992): 1-91.

Additionally, Tokyo could further complicate the intentions of a potential aggressor by developing what Paul Nitze has called a "strategic non-nuclear deterrent." By mating cutting-edge advanced conventional munitions with modern aircraft, submarines, and surface vessels, Japan could construct a viable deterrent force that would be in keeping with contemporary consensus on the role of the SDF, and would not violate the spirit of the three non-nuclear principles. Furthermore, the implicit understanding throughout Northeast Asia that Japan could probably arm its stealthy and accurate delivery systems with nuclear weapons in short order, if it so desired, would add credibility to the deterrent. While the deployment of a national missile defense system and a strategic non-nuclear deterrent would undoubtedly be controversial and expensive, it would allow Japan to stay true to its preference for a passive military role, without having to rely on the United States, or compromising the security of its people.

In sum, U.S. diplomacy should guide Tokyo during this period of transition in order to produce a more independent Japanese security policy that is: more responsible for overall security in Northeast Asia; non-threatening to other regional actors; in keeping with Japan's norms and preferences; and less dependent on U.S. military might.

Although China and Russia are guided by geo-political world views, they have also come to understand and respect the power of economics, and should find Japan an acceptable player in the regional balance of power. Japan's transition to a more active and independent role, however, could create uncertainties that would endanger Northeast Asian stability. For this reason it will become essential that the United States endeavor to involve Japan in a wide range of political, economic, and military security regimes with the objective of increasing understanding and transparency.

D. THE PROMISE OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY

While prescriptions of multilateralism may seem antithetical to the geo-political realities of Northeast Asia, various confidence-building measures (CBMs) may be useful in easing the transition to, and undesirable side-effects of a multipolar balance of power system. Dam, Deutch, Nye and Rowe argue that the "the United States should seek to manage Japan's rise to great power status by enmeshing Japan in a network of international institutions," and contend that this strategy promotes American interests in several ways:

*Such a network will encourage Japan to pursue its national interests through multilateral cooperation. It will also open up new avenues by which the United States can influence Japanese policy. Finally, it will prompt Japan to define its national interests in less insular terms.*¹⁴²

Moreover, Japan's participation in regional economic and security forums would reassure those who are still suspicious of Japan's intentions that Tokyo wishes to be a responsible actor on the world stage. "Unlike Germany, Japan does not benefit from a stabilizing framework of international economic and security institutions that channel the rise of Japanese power while reassuring other countries about Japanese intentions."¹⁴³ By encouraging Tokyo to expand its participation in regional forums, Washington could gently persuade Japan to assume more responsibility for its own security, while reassuring other regional actors that the U.S. understands their concerns, and intends to remain engaged in Northeast Asia.

An important preliminary step in discussing multilateral cooperative security regimes is to define terms. Often the terms cooperative security, and security cooperation

¹⁴² Kenneth Dam, John Deutch, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David M. Rowe, "Harnessing Japan: A U.S. Strategy for Managing Japan's Rise as a Global Power," *The Washington Quarterly* Spring 1993: 39.

¹⁴³ Dam, Deutch, Nye and Rowe 39.

are used interchangeably to refer to the same concept. Andrew Mack in his study, "Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," provides useful clarification:

*Security cooperation is associated with alliances, and alliances of states tend to be formed against another state, or group of states. What defines the alliance is common opposition to a common foe.*¹⁴⁴

Conversely,

*Cooperative security--sometimes known as 'common security'--is based on a somewhat different set of assumptions. Here the focus is less on preventing unprovoked aggression a la Saddam Hussein or Hitler, but rather to counteract the more probable causes of war--those which arise out of 'security dilemma' and 'conflict spirals.'*¹⁴⁵

Mack explains how common security functions:

*Common security policies do not require a specific enemy. They are based on the proposition that within a community of states there will inevitably be a range of more or less serious disputes, but that generally states would prefer not to resort to war to deal with those disputes. Common security policies offer the military means (arms control/confidence-building/defensive restructuring) intended to reduce the probability that such disputes will escalate and lead to a war that none of the parties originally intended. Common security policies are not an alternative to creative diplomacy and conflict resolution strategies but rather complement them.*¹⁴⁶

Until early 1991, Japan was reluctant to support multilateral approaches to regional security, primarily for two reasons. First "she had felt that her strained relations with the then Soviet Union might become more complicated by the latter's participation in a

¹⁴⁴ *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* Summer 1992: 31.

¹⁴⁵ Mack 31.

¹⁴⁶ Mack 32.

regional dialogue scheme in which she would also participate."¹⁴⁷ Second, Japan was concerned that multilateral plans might weaken her existing bilateral security relationship with the United States.¹⁴⁸

Similarly, the United States resisted one Cold War-era proposal after another for regional cooperative security in Northeast Asia. Ambitious plans for CBMs put forth by the Soviet Union, as well as Canada's North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD), and Australia's Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) were quickly rejected by Washington because they were seen as "providing the Soviets with a diplomatic entree to the region for which they would have to pay no price, and conferring on them the unwanted status of legitimate regional security 'players.'"¹⁴⁹ Additionally, regional security dialogues were dismissed because both Washington and the pro-Western states believed:

*... U.S. military superiority was the best guarantor of security in the region since it offered the best protection against aggression. That superiority was an established fact and was unlikely to be challenged since the Soviet economy was moving into crisis. The Soviet agenda for confidence- and security-building measures was clearly designed to reduce U.S. regional maritime military superiority. There was thus no point in engaging in negotiations with Moscow.*¹⁵⁰

Washington surmised that Moscow would take advantage of any multilateral security forums to push for measures, such as naval arms control, that would undermine U.S., and thus regional interests.

¹⁴⁷ Masashi Nishihara, "Multilateralism in Pacific Asia: The View from Tokyo," *Asian Defense Journal* Sept. 1994: 26.

¹⁴⁸ Nishihara "Multilateralism in Pacific Asia" 26.

¹⁴⁹ Mack "Security Cooperation" 22-23.

¹⁵⁰ Mack "Security Cooperation" 22.

Attitudes toward cooperative security have undergone a dramatic reversal in both the United States and Japan. For a number of reasons, including the end of the Cold War, the lessons of the Gulf War, Japan's desire for a greater regional role, and a grudging acceptance on both sides of the Pacific that times are changing, Washington and Tokyo are now indicating that they want to participate in Asian security dialogues.

Although a handful of organizations do exist that could provide a forum for Northeast Asian security issues, the relative lack of regional institutions suggests that some innovation is unavoidable. "The United States must involve Japan in the building of new international institutions as well."¹⁵¹ Patrick Cronin in his essay "Does Multilateralism Have a Future in Asia?" makes six generalizations regarding the perceived pitfalls and problems often ascribed to proposals for *new* multilateral institutions in Asia. First, "a number of critics point out that many proposals have something in common: namely a fallacious belief in an emerging Pacific Community that has been in the offing for more than a century."¹⁵² While it is certainly true that the Northeast Asian community does not share the same congruity of interests or tradition of cooperation as do the nations of Western Europe, an issue-specific approach could provide some common starting point. Organizations such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), which has focused primarily on trade issues, provide an example of successful institutions that began with specific, and modest objectives.

Second, the unfulfilled promise of arms control has caused many to sour on the prospects for meaningful security regimes. This is most likely the result of trying to impose the means of arms control in the absence of an agreement on the end goals among the political community in question. A simple solution is to forego discussions of arms

¹⁵¹ Dam, Deutch, Nye and Rowe 40.

¹⁵² *The New Pacific Security Environment: Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Ralph A. Cossa (Washington: NDU, 1993) 274.

control in favor of multilateral security dialogues that would focus on transparency, official and unofficial "roundtables," and other confidence-building measures.¹⁵³ Such dialogues can provide meaningful results and serve as a basis for more complex future negotiations.

Third, critics claim new multilateral proposals often serve to undermine existing institutions and efforts. Examples of institutions that may suffer include the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although some new issue-specific institutions may be required, particularly in realms where existing organizations have failed, the United States should "promote a greater Japanese role in those international and regional institutions that already exist."¹⁵⁴ Organizations in which a more active Japanese role would facilitate Tokyo's acceptance in Northeast Asia include: the Group of Seven (G-7); the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the World Bank; the International Monetary Fund; and the United Nations Security Council.¹⁵⁵

A fourth pitfall is the perceived inherent inefficiency of multilateralism in general. Despite Asia's virtual lack of multilateral tradition, success in other parts of the globe give reason to hold some optimism. Moreover, the success of ASEAN debunks claims that Asians are incapable of multilateralism, and sets a precedent for Northeast Asia to follow.

Fifth, it is alleged that most multilateral approaches are at odds with U.S. national security because they serve to dilute America's power in the region, discount the value of U.S. military might, and hasten the decline of U.S. bilateral alliances. While these institutions may, in one sense, dilute U.S. power, they also--as Dam, Deutch, Nye and Rowe pointed out above--open new avenues through which America can exert influence.

¹⁵³ Mack "Security Cooperation" 25.

¹⁵⁴ Dam, Deutch, Nye and Rowe 40.

¹⁵⁵ Dam, Deutch, Nye and Rowe 40.

This diversification of the U.S. portfolio will become even more crucial as changes in regional power distribution, and growth in the Japanese and Chinese economies further erodes traditional American bluechips. Moreover, it is important to recognize that with decreased U.S. influence comes a concurrent lessening of responsibility that will allow America to redirect previously committed resources and energy elsewhere.

Finally, critics point out that the costs of multilateralism are high, and that there is "little appetite among the great powers for ambitious institution building."¹⁵⁶ Although the costs associated with complex institutions, such as the United Nations or NATO, is admittedly high, history has shown them to be virtually irreplaceable. Furthermore, the types of new institutions proposed here are by no means elaborate. Regional dialogues and forums to discuss economics and security could be either government, or non-government, and--unlike more complex institutions--would not necessarily require mechanisms for integration, monitoring, or enforcement.

Several possibilities exist for creating new cooperative security regimes in Northeast Asia. Among the most ambitious is the call for an Asian version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), tentatively titled the CSCA. While it is true, as this thesis has already argued, that Europe and Asia are very different, a neophyte CSCA would begin with the modest goal of providing only a forum for the debate of security issues in the broadest sense of the word. "The purpose would be to provide a single platform for regional debate, in contrast to the multiple public and private means by which information is conveyed among Pacific states."¹⁵⁷

Another possibility is a hexagonal, or great power forum in Northeast Asia. By restricting its focus to this sub-region, a hexagonal forum could avoid the pitfalls associated with the diversity of Asia, and limit itself only to those security issues which

¹⁵⁶ Cronin "Multilateralism in Asia" 274-276.

¹⁵⁷ Cronin "Multilateralism in Asia" 267.

directly concern China, Japan, Russia, the United States, and the Koreans. This sort of informal great power concert could lend itself to *ad hoc*, cooperative solutions to Northeast Asian problems such as the North Korean nuclear weapons program, the Korean reunification issue, and the Senkaku Islands dispute.¹⁵⁸

Finally, Northeast Asian security might be enhanced by the creation of a maritime confidence- and security-building regime. Patrick Cronin cites one Australian proposal which focused on "a regional maritime surveillance and safety regime optimized for a spectrum of tasks" which fall short of war, including: compilation of a shipping plot of all vessels within the jurisdiction of the regime; monitoring of illegal activities, including drug smuggling, piracy, unlicensed fishing, and unauthorized population movements; planning for the naval control and protection of shipping transiting the area; search and rescue; controlling and monitoring marine pollution; and generally sharing maritime information and intelligence.¹⁵⁹

"The minimum need to support multilateralism calls for the spirit of creating a habit of getting together and being exposed to different views and overcoming the fear, based on ignorance, of other nations."¹⁶⁰ While a system of rigid security cooperation, based on alliance structures and the perception of a common enemy would indeed be detrimental to great power equilibrium in Northeast Asia, an informal collection of cooperative security forums would not inhibit the operation of the balance of power, and might smooth some of the rough edges associated with regional geo-politics. Although

¹⁵⁸ Cronin "Multilateralism in Asia" 270.

¹⁵⁹ Commodore W.S.G. Bateman, RAN, "Multinational Naval Cooperation--A Pacific View." Paper for Conference on *Multinational Naval Cooperation* held at the Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich, 12-13 December 1991, 19-20.

¹⁶⁰ Nishihara "Multilateralism" 28.

multilateral prescriptions may be unable to change the systemic causes of Northeast Asian great power competition, they may be useful in easing the symptoms.

Moreover, as post-Cold War conditions continue to erode America's traditional avenues of influence, encouraging Tokyo to participate in regional dialogues--alongside the U.S.-- will not only facilitate Japan's acceptance into the Northeast Asian security community, but will provide new inroads for Washington's diplomacy.

VII. THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF GRAND STRATEGY

"With 30,000 men in transports at the Downs, the English can paralyze 300,000 of my army, and that will reduce us to the rank of a second-class power!" Napoleon Bonaparte

The military aspects of a grand strategy of selective engagement could be characterized as traditionally maritime, but would be concerned with much more than simply naval war doctrine. Mackubin Owens, of the Naval War College, attributes the theoretical basis of maritime grand strategy to the writings of Sir Julian Corbett, who wrote: "By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor."¹⁶¹ Militarily, a maritime grand strategy would take advantage of the inherent strengths of a strategy rooted in flexibility and robust mobility. In today's world of high-speed, high endurance air transport, it is conceivable, though unlikely, that a maritime grand strategy could be employed *without* ships!

A. MARITIME VS. CONTINENTAL POWER

The ability to move armies by sea (or maritime air routes) gives the maritime nation a commanding advantage in times of war. Colin Gray, in *The Leverage of Sea Power* examines ten major conflicts in history in which maritime powers battled with continental hegemonies, and reaches several important conclusions:

The historical evidence reveals that superior sea power typically functions to permit its owner to use time in the search for advantage. Sea power allows the protraction of conflict and tends to set up a frustrated continental enemy to overreach on land. History shows that in key respects an important advantage in sea power grants the ability to control the

¹⁶¹ quoted in Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Toward a Maritime Grand Strategy: Paradigm for a New Security Environment," *Strategic Review* Spring 1993: 12.

*geostrategic terms of engagement in war. Depending on who controls the sea, water is a highway or a barrier. The continuity of the world's seas and oceans translates into a global mobility and agility for maritime forces and for merchant shipping which can have no continental parallel. That mobility and agility has been used time and time again, in all historical periods, to achieve surprise and the full strategic advantage of the surprise effect. Finally, and notwithstanding the several revolutions in transportation technologies for all environments over the centuries, superior sea power has enabled its owners to knit together coalitions with a total strategic weight greatly superior to those secured by dominant continental strength.*¹⁶²

Insular states, which are best suited for a maritime grand strategy, have the luxury of foregoing a heavy, land-based forward defense and, by virtue of their flexibility, still retain the capability to act unilaterally or multilaterally, in the strength, venue, and fashion of their choosing. This capability gives that nation's forces the freedom of maneuver and action necessary to respond to crises of a wide range of circumstance and scope. Moreover, a maritime grand strategy allows "island" nations, such as nineteenth century Britain or the twentieth century United States, to play a unique role in balance of power systems: that of the offshore balancer. Morton Kaplan discusses the English example:

*It is possible that a major factor accounting for British success in the 'balancing' role in the nineteenth century lay in the fact that Great Britain was predominantly a naval power and had no territorial ambitions on the European continent. These facts increased the tolerance of other national actors for Britain's 'balancing' role. As a preponderant maritime power, Great Britain could interfere with the shipping of other powers and could transport its small army; it also was able to use its naval capabilities to dispel invading forces.*¹⁶³

By permitting the maritime power the flexibility to act as balancer, and facilitating the creation of coalitions and alignments, the military elements of a maritime national strategy

¹⁶² Gray *The Leverage of Sea Power* xi-xii.

¹⁶³ Kaplan 289.

serve not only military ends, but also diplomatic purposes, and thus contribute to an overall grand strategy that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Historically, Colin Gray asserts, maritime powers have employed some common military strategies. Although these strategies may also be effective against other maritime nations, they have typically been most successful against a continental adversary. First, a sea power can impose a commercial, and in part, maritime blockade to redirect trade, and exhaust a continental foe financially, though this is rarely successful in the modern age. Second, if the financial exhaustion of an enemy is impracticable, a supply blockade, aimed at interdicting the materials of war, may provide strategic leverage. Third, a maritime power in a position of weakness can raid the periphery of a land bastion, and conduct "warfare for the purposes of imposing a debilitating dispersal in military deployment on the enemy, sustaining morale at home and among captive nations, for the encouragement of neutrals to keep their options open, and to inflict damage."¹⁶⁴ Fourth, a sea power can move beyond raiding to a strategy of peripheral warfare. This strategy takes full advantage of geo-strategic mobility to impose protracted combat on unfavorable terms on a continental enemy. Fifth, the maritime power can engage in overseas conquest by attacking or exploiting those interests of the continental power that are at risk to the sea. Finally, the maritime power can, in extremis, apply direct pressure to a land power by committing substantial ground forces and assembling an anti-hegemonic coalition on the continent.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Gray *The Leverage of Sea Power* 39.

¹⁶⁵ Gray *The Leverage of Sea Power* 31-55.

B. FROM FORWARD DEPLOYMENT TO POWER PROJECTION

Since the early years of the Cold War, the United States has relied on an essentially continental grand strategy to achieve its objectives throughout the globe. Though "maritime strategy" was an essential element of Cold War national defense policy and its goal of containment, its scope was limited to naval doctrine, and its primary function was, and still is to support the ground and air forces needed for a forward defense on the Eurasian continent. Jan Breemer argues that two reasons dictated the continental disposition of U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War:

First, the U.S. Navy was expected to have to fight its way across the Atlantic in order to reinforce a beleaguered Europe, tying up most of its power in the struggle for command of the sea; naval power projection could make an indirect contribution at best to the decisive campaign on land. Next, and more important, the credibility of the American security guarantee to NATO demanded a 'permanent' commitment of ground forces.¹⁶⁶

Under certain conditions, even the great maritime powers have found it necessary to adopt a more continentally focused grand strategy. Just as Britain was forced to temporarily abandon its cost-effective, but limited maritime policies when faced with continental hegemony in the form of Napoleonic France and Imperial and Nazi Germany, so the United States found a continental focus to be essential in containing the Soviet empire within the rimlands of Eurasia.

Despite the end of the Cold War, this continental focus and the force structure it dictates, remain central to U.S. strategic planning in Central Europe and Northeast Asia. In the context of an evolving balance of power system in post-Cold War Northeast Asia, U.S. interests might be best served by a maritime security policy. Mackubin Owens contends that while both continental and maritime grand strategies have the goal of keeping

¹⁶⁶ "Naval Strategy is Dead," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute* Feb. 1994: 53.

regional peace and influencing the Eurasian balance of power, the maritime approach provides far more flexibility at a moderate cost. Moreover, he adds:

*A maritime grand strategy enables the U.S. to actively protect its interests by shaping the security environment. Yet it does not require the costly continental commitments of the Cold War. In addition, a maritime grand strategy is applicable to the strategic circumstances of the U.S. no matter what kind of security environment prevails: an essentially 'benign' world, dominated by collective security, or a hostile environment, characterized by 'international anarchy.'*¹⁶⁷

This approach to grand strategy, applied to contemporary U.S. defense policy, suggests a decreased reliance on a forward-deployed military posture. In its place, a maritime grand strategy would rely on easily transportable, flexible forces, deployed by sea or air from U.S. or international territory, to demonstrate resolve, police trouble spots, protect interests, or enable the introduction of heavier forces when required.

General George Crist, in his 1990 work, "A U.S. Military Strategy for a Changing World," proposes that America restructure its armed forces to place primary reliance on projecting military power from the United States. Advocating a shift from the Cold War era forward-deployed strategy to a more "feasible and realistic" power-projection strategy, Crist asserts:

*Militarily, a power-projection strategy dictates that the United States look seriously to strengthening its conventional force deployment capability from the continental United States. This involves both forces and means. It also entails a reordering of priorities toward the attainment of a genuine ability to expeditiously deploy tailored force packages from home bases to potential areas of crisis or impending conflict.*¹⁶⁸

The vast oceanic distances of the Asia-Pacific require that any regional military strategy that relies on power-projection be backed with formidable transport assets. The

¹⁶⁷ Owens "Toward a Maritime Grand Strategy" 13.

¹⁶⁸ *Strategic Review* Winter 1990: 18.

most essential military elements of a U.S. maritime grand strategy for Northeast Asia would unquestionably be strategic air- and sealift. To again quote Churchill, "Victory is the beautiful bright coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed."

Shifting America's strategic weight from forward-deployment to power-projection would not be without complications. Because strategic air- and sealift are expensive, attempting to deploy forces of the size and composition of those currently in Northeast Asia, entirely from the United States would be cost-prohibitive. Instead, the United States should use its comparative advantage in high-technology to ensure that whenever possible, relatively small American forces will be capable of successfully engaging larger, less-lethal units.

Additionally, the maritime pre-positioning program, which has been expanded since the Gulf war, should continue to grow. These flexible assets are relatively inexpensive, and provide an immense boost to power-projection capabilities. General Crist notes that the seventeen pre-positioned ships at Diego Garcia (in 1990) carried 165,000 short tons of ammunition and supplies--the equivalent of more than 6,100 C-141 transport aircraft loads.¹⁶⁹

Finally, strategic lift forces should grow in relative proportion to other defense assets. As essential tools of a post-Cold War military structure, air- and sealift should comprise a larger share of a force that will have fewer strategic bombers, nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, and heavy armor units. While maintaining a balanced force is vital, it is important to recognize that "balanced" is a subjective term. What constituted a balanced force for dealing with the Soviet threat is no longer suitable. "The current environment, with regional threats erupting with little or no notice, favors smaller, highly trained forces that can go to war rapidly over larger forces that take months to get to the

¹⁶⁹ Crist 22.

fight."¹⁷⁰ In an increasingly complex and uncertain Northeast Asia, balanced military forces should not be massive and forward-deployed, but flexible and easily transported. "If necessary, combat forces (including ships and combat aircraft) will have to be sacrificed in order to ensure that the remainder of the force will be able to deploy rapidly enough to be useful."¹⁷¹

A maritime grand strategy would require that the service branches replace the current emphasis on geographic and functional responsibilities with an emphasis on integration and "comparative advantage." This new focus would ensure that a broad range of capabilities could be brought to bear as required by any situation. Recognizing that each service has strengths (comparative advantage) and weaknesses, the force planning doctrine of a maritime grand strategy should be centered around the concept of joint force sequencing. "The goal of joint force sequencing is to provide the correct capability that the Unified Commander needs at the appropriate time. . . Stressing comparative advantage means that service components are utilized across the spectrum of conflict in such a way that the strengths are exploited to the fullest while its weaknesses are minimized."¹⁷² Owens' graphic representation of this process is reproduced below:

¹⁷⁰ Robin E. Rathbun, "Strategic Mobility for the 1990s: The Mobility Requirements Study," *Strategic Review* Summer 1992: 55.

¹⁷¹ Rathbun 55.

¹⁷² Owens "Toward a Maritime Grand Strategy" 15-16.

Power Projection System for the Spectrum of Conflict				
Presence	Crisis	Conflict	Theater War	Global War
Day-to-day operations				
Shape the security environment				
Support Diplomacy				
	crisis response			
	rapid deployment	rapid reinforcement		
			deliberate reinforcement	
			sustainment	
naval forces/SOF dominant>>>>>	enable>>>>>>	naval forces subordinate>>>>>>>>		
land-based forces subordinate>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>		land-based forces dominant>>>>>>		

C. A FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The implications of joint force sequencing for service component structure are clear, and the Navy is moving in the right direction with *From the Sea*. This revolutionary White Paper recognizes the realities of the post-Cold War security environment, and acknowledges that America's maritime interests are not likely to be threatened in the near future by a preponderant force on the scale of the Soviet Union. With this in mind, the doctrine redirects the Navy's focus toward regional threats and challenges.

From the Sea codifies these perceptions for the naval service by outlining the types of missions, and thus the force structure, that are required by the new climate. *From the Sea* asserts that the Navy will be an important part of the principle elements of national strategy--strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. Specifically, naval forces will provide powerful yet unobtrusive presence; strategic deterrence; control of the seas; extended and continuous on-scene crisis response; project precise power from the sea; and provide sealift if larger scale warfighting scenarios emerge.¹⁷⁴

Much of this is not really new. What *is* new about *From the Sea* is the fundamental shift it represents away from open-ocean (blue water) warfighting "on the sea," toward joint operations conducted "from the sea." In doing so, the Navy has reaffirmed, and in fact redoubled its dedication to the amphibious and expeditionary warfare missions, and to strategic sealift.

In describing the Navy's new role, *From the Sea* examines its most important elements. The focus on "littoral" warfare is evident in the document's discussion of "Naval Expeditionary Forces," "Joint Operations," and "Operating Forward, From the Sea." Particularly indicative of the Navy's changing priorities is its willingness to alter

¹⁷⁴ Department of the Navy, ...*From the Sea* (Washington: USGPO, 1992) 1-8.

the standard operating procedures of aircraft carriers and submarines. Even the once immutable carrier battlegroup is on the table, as *From the Sea* discusses tailoring groups for special needs, and building task forces around amphibious ships. Indeed, the mating of aircraft carriers and U.S. Army units during the initial phases of *Operation Uphold Democracy* demonstrates the potential of this doctrinal shift.¹⁷⁵

Although the Navy must not neglect strategic deterrence and sea control, the prevailing paucity of likely threats permits greater attention elsewhere. With presumed control of the sea lines of communication and the "blue water," naval planners can now afford more emphasis on naval expeditionary forces, strategic sealift, joint operations, and littoral warfare. The Navy's plans to modernize its aging amphibious force is an important first step. Other areas that should be tackled include fleet sealift, naval gunfire/missile support, theater missile defense, deep-strike missile technology, anti-diesel submarine warfare, and anti-mine warfare. Additionally, Congress should take action to reverse the precipitous decline in the U.S.-flagged merchant marine force.

More radical proposals should also be considered. With the North Atlantic now free of Soviet submarines, the Navy should consider shifting more assets to the Pacific. Deploying a relatively larger force in the Pacific would provide assurance of America's commitment to remain engaged in Asia, and would not affect U.S. deployments to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Seventh Fleet vessels on station in Southwest Asia would be readily available for contingencies in either the Mediterranean or East Asia.

Closely tied to the Navy's littoral warfare mission is the Marine Corps. Ideally suited for crisis response and rapid deployment, the Marine Corps should continue to be spared from across-the-board budget cutting. For years the Marines have been moving away from their traditional amphibious role, and toward one of a professional expeditionary force. This trend should be continued and encouraged. The Marine Corps

¹⁷⁵ ...*From the Sea* 1-7.

does not need the capability to land division-sized forces on heavily fortified beaches, but rather the speed and versatility to land appropriately-sized expeditionary forces, by air or sea, in strategically advantageous locations *near* the sea. Nor does the Corps require heavy armor, or long-term sustainability. Another possibility the Marine Corps should consider is foregoing their fixed-wing close air support in favor of more flexible and deployable rotary-wing assets. In turn, the Navy could provide more support to expeditionary forces by acquiring "fire support" ships equipped with large numbers of advanced rocket and missile systems.¹⁷⁶ Additionally, carrier-based naval aviation could assume more responsibility by emphasizing multipurpose aircraft capable of close-in strike, local air-superiority and battlefield interdiction, while surface and submarine-launched cruise missiles could provide a stealthy and effective deep-strike capability until U.S. Air Force assets are deployed.¹⁷⁷

As the dominant players in "theater war," the Army and Air Force are indispensable elements of a maritime grand strategy. Blechman, et al., highlight the Army's role in a post-Cold War world:

The Army is now, and should remain, the primary U.S. armed force for seizing and holding territory. The vast preponderance of Army forces should be based in the United States to ensure global flexibility and to reduce domestic and international political strains... In structuring its forces, the Army needs to shift further than now planned from its past emphasis on heavily armored forces to lighter types of capabilities that can be deployed more rapidly for the initial defense of U.S. overseas interests. Demise of the Soviet Army reduces the need for heavily armored U.S. armored divisions intended for maneuver warfare. Advanced technologies

¹⁷⁶ Barry M. Blechman, et al., *Key West Revisited: Roles and Missions of the US Armed Forces in the Twenty-first Century*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 8, March 1993: 22.

¹⁷⁷ Jan S. Breemer, "The End of Naval Strategy: Revolutionary Change and the Future of American Naval Power," *Strategic Review* Spring 1994: 47.

*make it possible to lighten Army forces, moreover, while actually augmenting their capabilities.*¹⁷⁸

While heavy forces are typically more difficult to transport, a maritime grand strategy does not necessitate that all Army forces be "light." The important factor is transportation, and transportation must be designed to move heavy forces. In order to take advantage of the strategic benefits of a maritime grand strategy, Army equipment for the twenty-first century must be either prepositioned or transportable. Moreover, enough lift must be available to move forces quickly. It is unlikely that another opponent will grant the United States the six months that were required in the Gulf to deploy a theater army.

Army units should be trained and equipped to operate in both low and high-intensity environments and in various climes and terrain. Furthermore, decreases in the Army's size must be offset with better training and advanced weapons technology. High-tech training systems, coupled with improved anti-armor, theater missile defense, and C3I systems will provide Army forces with greater lethality and flexibility in a smaller package. This "leaner, meaner" package when mated with greatly expanded strategic air- and sealift, would serve as the principle fighting force in conflicts ranging from reinforcement of an expeditionary brigade, to major war.

Finally, a maritime grand strategy has important implications for the U.S. Air Force. Though some Air Force units (tactical lift, SOF, long-range reconnaissance) might play a role in the early phases of conflict, their primary focus should be toward "theater war." Naturally, this implies a heavy accent on the mobility elements of air power. In order to support a maritime grand strategy, the Air Force should place even more emphasis than is currently given to the long-range transport of complete units, both their own and those of the Army, to secure staging areas.

¹⁷⁸ Blechman, et al. 18.

Air Force tactical air power is also crucial to the success of medium- and large-scale conflicts. Without rapidly deployable tactical air units to accomplish air-superiority and perform deep strikes and battlefield interdiction, swiftly deployed ground units are of no use. Greater deployability has been achieved for ground-based tactical air units, and this trend should continue.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ Blechman, et al. 25.

VIII. THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GRAND STRATEGY

Perhaps more than any other region, Northeast Asia yields evidence that a principal threat to the security of U.S. interests in the post-Cold War era lies in the realm of economics. Accordingly, grand strategy must place greater emphasis on domestic and foreign policies designed to advance U.S. economic interests. Several alternative strategies have been proposed. Noted Japan specialist Chalmers Johnson has advocated a form of "industrial policy" for the United States, combined with the coordination of fiscal and trade policies with Tokyo.¹⁸⁰ Conservative writers, such as Dam, Deutch, Nye, and Rowe contend that the central goal of U.S. strategy toward Asia must be to create a stable macroeconomic environment, and that such a strategy should recognize that "the main causes of poor U.S. economic performance are flawed macroeconomic policies and an inability to take action domestically--in capital formation, worker education, and technology--and not the trading practices of an Asian ally."¹⁸¹ Ellings and Olsen suggest that liberals and conservatives can find "common ground" between managed and free trade to solve such crucial challenges as: access to technology, the uses of aid, strained trade relations, and the repercussions of foreign direct investment.¹⁸²

Definitions of grand strategy often include references to economics. Sir Basil Liddell-Hart in his book *Strategy*, argued:

Grand Strategy should calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of nations in order to sustain the fighting services... Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy--which should take account

¹⁸⁰ "Wake Up America! Wake Up America!," *Critical Intelligence* August 1994: 3-14.

¹⁸¹ Dam, Deutch, Nye and Rowe 35.

¹⁸² Ellings and Olsen 133-134.

*of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, to weaken the opponent's will... It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace--for its security and prosperity.*¹⁸³

The importance of sound economic policies to national security is widely recognized. While arguing that only arms can defeat arms, Colin Gray admits:

*... it is probably correct to argue, for example, that **the** decisive advantage of the Grand Alliance in World War II was the U.S. economy; **the** decisive advantage of Great Britain in its second hundred years war with France from 1689 to 1815 was in the organization of its public finance (the ability to run and manage a national debt, because of an efficient system of taxation); while **the** decisive advantage of the Byzantine Empire for the first five hundred years of its existence (until the 1040s) was the stability of its gold-based currency.*¹⁸⁴

Throughout the Cold War, U.S. politicians and strategists, while ostensibly separating economics and political-military strategy, demonstrated an underlying belief in the relevance of economic vitality. Although President Harry S. Truman institutionalized the concept of Soviet containment as the preeminent postwar U.S. national security objective, he believed that "national security does not consist only of an army, a navy, and an air force. It rests on a much broader base. It depends on a sound economy."¹⁸⁵

Dwight D. Eisenhower, perhaps better than any other postwar U.S. president, understood the economic dimensions of security: "Beyond a wise and reasonable level, which is always changing... money spent on arms may be money wasted... National

¹⁸³ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York, 1974): 322.

¹⁸⁴ "Strategic Sense, Strategic Nonsense" 11.

¹⁸⁵ Quoted in Joseph S. Romm, *Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations P, 1993) 53.

security requires far more than military power. Economic and moral factors play indispensable roles. Any program that endangers our economy could defeat us."¹⁸⁶

Both Truman and Eisenhower were suggesting that the economic aspects of national security go well beyond the simple need to create wealth that can pay for armies. They recognized that a sound economy in and of itself is a national interest worth protecting. As America's complex economy comes to depend more and more on international trade--trade that is increasingly by way of Asia--U.S. grand strategy must adjust to this reality.

Grand strategy is faced with two fundamental concerns in regard to economic security: first, how should America organize its "own house" in order to produce the strongest possible economy vis-a-vis Northeast Asia; and second, how should the U.S. handle the competing economies of the region, particularly the trade practices of Japan and China. The remainder of this chapter will address these questions in three sections: macroeconomic stability and infrastructure; trade and industrial policy; and strategic industry.

A. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

There are several reasons to be concerned for America's economic future. Theodore Sorensen in a 1990 essay published in *Foreign Affairs* notes:

We have the world's largest trade deficit. We are losing our competitive position, our market share in both domestic and export markets, in one after another of the industries in which our leadership was once vaunted: consumer electronics, machine tools, automobiles, steel, advanced computers, semiconductor chips, laser printers, and design and manufacturing technology. We have become dangerously dependent upon foreign sources (once again) for the energy that we consume at a higher rate than any other nation to fuel our factories, homes and transportation systems. We have the largest gap between earnings and savings, the

¹⁸⁶ Quoted in Romm *Defining National Security* 53.

*highest budget deficit (in absolute terms) and one of the lowest rates of productivity growth of any nation in the industrialized world. We have become--thanks to our trade deficit and the enormous foreign borrowings required in light of our low savings rate and large federal budget deficits--the world's largest debtor.*¹⁸⁷

Sorensen goes on to argue that if these trends are allowed to persist, "this nation's economic effectiveness and independence--meaning the flexibility to make decisions and the ability to fend for oneself--would indeed be endangered." Though not all analysts paint such a gloomy picture, most would agree that America faces serious economic challenges.

In Northeast Asia, U.S. economic policy is particularly salient. Trade relations with Japan, America's nearest competitor, and China, potentially the world's largest economy will no doubt play a vital role in future national security calculations. Although unfair trade practices on the part of Japan and China are a reality, much of the blame for poor U.S. economic performance can be attributed to shortcomings in American macroeconomic policy and infrastructure.

Macroeconomic imbalances among the world's major economies have contributed significantly to declining U.S. economic competitiveness. While the 1980s saw Japan keep the yen artificially low to promote exports, the strong Reagan dollar led to a surge of cheap imports and decimated American export industries by pricing U.S. goods out of foreign markets. "Creating a stable macroeconomic environment must be a central objective of a U.S. strategy toward Japan."¹⁸⁸

Another challenge facing the American economy is simply that "the United States consumes more than it produces and does not save enough to build the additional productive capacity to make up the difference, leading to a trade deficit that supplies

¹⁸⁷ "Rethinking National Security," *Foreign Affairs* Summer 1990: 8.

¹⁸⁸ Dam, Deutch, Nye and Rowe 35.

excess American consumption and inflows of foreign capital that make up for insufficient American savings."¹⁸⁹ Moreover, this extremely low domestic savings rate means U.S. banks have less funds available to make loans, and thus the cost of borrowing is higher. Unlike their Japanese counterparts who, as a consequence of extraordinarily high Japanese savings rates (around 20 percent), have access to affordable capital, U.S. borrowers pay a much higher cost, and are therefore less willing to make long-term investments. Particularly unappealing to U.S. investors are projects involving industrial modernization or infrastructure because these investments do not produce immediate or guaranteed results. The outcome is that U.S. industry lacks needed reinvestment, and consequently cannot keep pace with productivity gains being made in Japan, China, and South Korea.

Similarly, the federal budget deficit contributes to the trade imbalance. By spending more than it takes in, the government creates a demand for goods and services that is out of equilibrium with supply. This unbalanced situation can culminate in two possible outcomes: very high inflation, or the offsetting of inflationary pressures by importing large quantities of cheap goods.

U.S. grand strategy should address these macroeconomic problems at their root. A first step in providing for the national economic security of the United States is to reduce, and eventually eliminate the federal budget deficit. Once thought an impossible task, there now seems to be a consensus for doing so. Though budget cutting is a process that goes well beyond U.S. Northeast Asia policy, the transition to a grand strategy of selective engagement in that region would provide the sort of political and military economizing required by deficit reduction.

A second step toward setting America's macroeconomic house in order is to establish policies aimed at gradually altering U.S. behavior toward savings and consumption. Although some would argue that America's economy is consumer-based,

¹⁸⁹ Theodore H. Moran, "International Economics and National Security," *Foreign Affairs* Winter 1990-91: 78.

and should not be tinkered with, a slight redirection could significantly improve U.S. economic security. Unlike the economy of the immediate postwar period, today's U.S. economy depends heavily on international trade. Just as the Japanese have found success in an economy characterized by high personal savings rates, the United States would reap several benefits from a shift in this direction. Several options are available, most notably the incremental revision of U.S. tax codes to encourage higher savings by private citizens.

Moreover, this policy shift could serve as a partial solution to another dilemma: the "graying" of America, and the troubled future of Social Security. Through programs similar to a tax-deferred (or even tax-exempt) individual retirement account, the federal government could both encourage personal savings, and lighten the load on future taxpayers. As a consequence of higher savings, U.S. lenders would be in a better position to make affordable loans to domestic business and industry, thus adding to productive capacity, and allowing for the modernization of industry and infrastructure that is needed if American firms are to compete against the highly subsidized leading-sector industries of Japan, China and South Korea.

As a third step, U.S. grand strategy should recognize that government has a role in constructing and improving domestic infrastructure, as well as creating a favorable international environment for U.S. economic interests. Of particular salience to national security is the cultivation of a versatile and well-educated workforce for both direct and indirect security applications that can compete against increasingly competent workforces in Japan, China, and South Korea. U.S. national security planners should take a keen interest in ensuring that federal policies are addressing shortcomings in the education of American youth, and providing encouragement and incentives for meaningful training by private institutions and industry.¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests," *Survival* Jan.-Feb. 1991: 11.

Finally, national security policy should endorse steps to create a more viable free trade environment, both in Northeast Asia, and globally. C. Fred Bergsten, in an essay for *Foreign Affairs*, contends that while the GATT Uruguay Round is a step in the right direction, much more is needed:

The Big Three [U.S., European Community, Japan] should thus push for the implementation of four sweeping new reforms by 2000: (1) elimination of all tariffs on all industrial trade; (2) a complete ban on all quantitative trade barriers including 'voluntary export restraint agreements'; (3) a sharp expansion in the independence and mandate given the GATT to police the system; and (4) creation of an instrument similar to the GATT for investment issues to provide a stable framework for international corporate activities (and help resist protectionist pressures in this area, notably in the United States). An even bolder approach would be agreement to finally establish the 'International Trade Organization,' to cover all these issues and many more, that was originally intended to be the comprehensive 'third leg' of the postwar economic system (along with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank).¹⁹¹

An affirmative step in the direction of Northeast Asian free-trade was taken at the Jakarta session of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, in November 1994, in the form of an agreement in principle to end most import and export tariffs by 2010 in the United States, Japan, and other developed countries; and in less-developed Asia-Pacific states by 2020.¹⁹² If carried out, this decision could significantly improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms in Northeast Asian markets, and contribute to the economic welfare, and thus national security, of the United States.

¹⁹¹ "The World Economy After the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* Summer 1990: 110.

¹⁹² Andrew Pollack, "Asia-Pacific Countries Near Agreement on Trade," *The New York Times* 15 Nov. 1994: A1.

B. TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY

While macroeconomic policy may be helpful in solving the problem of America's chronic trade deficits with Northeast Asia, other measures may also be warranted. Throughout the Cold war, U.S. policies have allowed unfair trade practices on the part of East Asian allies in order to bolster their economies and sustain the bilateral security arrangements necessary to contain the Soviets. "While these countries pursued mercantilistic policies at odds with American free-market and free-trade doctrines, for purposes of grand strategy the United States averted its eyes and clung to the fiction of similarity, even as its industries succumbed one by one to East Asian competitors who were not behaving at all as Western economic principles said they should."¹⁹³ The end of the Cold War, and the options presented by a grand strategy of selective engagement, means that the U.S. no longer needs to maintain the fiction that America and Japan have coinciding economic interests. This realization would allow the U.S. to acknowledge the systemic differences between American and East Asian economies and deal with them in a more flexible and pragmatic manner. Rather than overlook unfair trade practices, or try to remake Northeast Asian economies in the American image, U.S. negotiators should focus on areas in which inequities exist and push for full resolution through formal procedures.¹⁹⁴

Karel van Wolferen, in his article "The Japan Problem Revisited," acknowledges that hard bargaining with the Japanese is necessary, but cautions:

... it must be made clear that the politically protected economic system of Japan is not an evil entity. It is, rather, a system driven by different motives that must be reckoned with in the foreign policies of other states.

¹⁹³ Selig S. Harrison and Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., "Pacific Agenda: Defense or Economics?" *Foreign Policy* Summer 1990: 59.

¹⁹⁴ Harrison and Prestowitz 72 and 76.

*Washington must address the deep, underlying sense of insecurity that helps shape Japan's motives. Various symbolic actions are available to help Japanese powerholders believe that the world is not against them, such as giving Japan a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Such a move, however, should only be considered as part of a larger covenant.*¹⁹⁵

There is good reason not to push America's Northeast Asian trade partners too far, too fast. The first possibility, particularly in regard to Japan, is that excess U.S. pressure may result in a trade war. Sorensen notes, "declaring war--a trade war--would represent a resounding defeat for our country, dependent as it is on an open trading system. Even to name and blame a supposed 'enemy' would only handicap our effort to keep that system open."¹⁹⁶

A second undesirable possibility is that too much pressure from the U.S. to rapidly open markets might contribute to the fragmentation of the world into partially exclusive trading blocs, and bring an end to the relatively free international trade system that has flourished in the postwar period, largely under U.S. auspices. Presumably, three blocs would form: a European bloc, led by Germany; a North-South American bloc, led by the United States; and an Asian bloc, probably led by Japan. Such an arrangement would not only edge America out of Northeast Asian markets, but would be inherently unstable, with each bloc harboring suspicions about the joint economic intentions of the other two. "Moreover, an Asian bloc would in itself be very unstable, as it is highly doubtful that the expanding Southeast Asian economies would long accept the subcontractor position that Tokyo's businessmen and bureaucrats have in mind for them."¹⁹⁷

In addition to an active trade policy, U.S. economic interests vis-a-vis Northeast Asia could be advanced by way of an industrial policy. A U.S. industrial policy for

¹⁹⁵ *Foreign Affairs* Fall 1990: 54.

¹⁹⁶ Sorensen "Rethinking National Security" 10.

¹⁹⁷ van Wolferen "The Japan Problem Revisited" 54.

Northeast Asia would not endeavor to maintain precarious leadership in declining sectors, or create mechanisms to prop up and protect uncompetitive industries, rather, U.S. policy should offer encouragement, incentives and research assets to domestic firms that show potential in promising markets. Though inducements would preferably be offered in the form of tax-incentives, direct assistance might also be beneficial in some sectors. "It is eminently logical to use part of the 'peace dividend' that may result from lessened defense outlays to finance these expenditures. since they will be aimed at achieving many of the same national goals--preserving America's world role and national security--as the military programs that will be cut."¹⁹⁸

If America is to develop a true industrial policy, a crucial question will be who is to administer it. Currently "no one agency of the federal government has broad responsibility for research and other activities related to civilian technology or for strategic coordination of technology policy at the national level."¹⁹⁹ In the executive branch, responsibility for R&D is dispersed among twelve agencies. In Congress, the civilian science budget is divided among as many as thirteen appropriations subcommittees. This arrangement may have some logic, but it makes prioritization and compromise virtually impossible. Furthermore:

*The problem is compounded by the lack of federal focus on technology's economic implications. Individual agencies are responsible for the research and technology that relate solely to their particular missions. Only the Department of Energy and the Department of Agriculture extend their focus to economic performance, and then only in specific sectors.*²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Bergsten "The World Economy" 105.

¹⁹⁹ B.R. Inman and Daniel F. Burton, Jr., "Technology and Competitiveness: The New Policy Frontier," *Foreign Affairs* Spring 1990: 129.

²⁰⁰ Inman and Burton 130.

The economic aspects of grand strategy would be well served by the creation of an independent agency, perhaps along the lines of the Federal Reserve Board, to coordinate and oversee U.S. industrial policy. Ideally, a U.S. agency for trade and industry would be staffed with highly qualified trade and industry experts, as well as area specialists, and headed by long-term appointees who would be insulated from executive and legislative political interference. By committing time and resources to economic planning today, an agency for trade and industry could reap valuable long-term economic gains, and thus advance the interests of U.S. national security. "The same kind of effort that we mounted to achieve technological superiority in the military arena must now be mounted to integrate our military technology with commercial activities, to translate our edge in basic research and innovation into competitive and marketable high-tech products, to become more adept at improving existing industrial technology, and to move those improvements more quickly to market with firm control of both cost and quality."²⁰¹

C. STRATEGIC INDUSTRY

While the purpose of an industrial policy is to encourage and promote the growth of domestic industries that show potential, other U.S. manufacturing capabilities should be preserved for more traditional security reasons. In *The Japan That Can Really Say No*, the Japanese politician and author Ishihara Shintaro wrote of the Persian Gulf War: "What made [the Americans'] pinpoint bombing so effective was PVT, a high-quality semiconductor used in the brain part of the computers that control most modern weapons. There were ninety-three foreign-made semiconductors in the weapons used by the United States. Among them, ninety-two were made in Japan." America "should wake up from this illusion" of superpower status because it "had to ask other countries to contribute

²⁰¹ Sorensen "Rethinking National Security" 11.

money so it could fight, and it depended on foreign technology to carry out its war strategy."²⁰²

Undoubtedly, America's defense industrial base has undergone a process of globalization. In some respects, this globalization is advantageous to U.S. national security, as "it brings superior performance, innovation and lower prices for military as well as commercial purchasers."²⁰³ The danger, however, stems from situations in which one, or very few nations control the supply of technology that is vital to U.S. national security. In such cases, "a survey of post-World War II experience suggests that external domination of technology, goods and services may well lead to persistent attempts at meddling, manipulation and harassment in the recipients' sovereign affairs, even in peacetime relations among allies."²⁰⁴

Dependence on foreign technology poses a dilemma for U.S. grand strategy in Northeast Asia: although American economic security depends on the maintenance of the free trade system; and the U.S. defense establishment benefits from the high-quality, affordable products that are its result; relying on a small number of foreign distributors for vital technologies may compromise America's national sovereignty and security. In order to solve this dilemma, U.S. grand strategy requires a market-oriented compromise "that reflects both the desire for competition and the imperatives of national policy."²⁰⁵

Theodore Moran, in his study "The Globalization of America's Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of Foreign Dependence," proposes criteria for determining if the concentration of external suppliers of a particular technology is such that a genuine threat to security exists:

²⁰² Quoted in Romm 74.

²⁰³ Moran "International Economics" 80.

²⁰⁴ Moran "International Economics" 80.

²⁰⁵ Harrison and Prestowitz 75.

As a first approximation of the critical threshold, the defense industrial strategist can draw on standard measures of oligopoly strength, for example, that no four countries or four companies supply more than fifty percent of the arm's-length world market. This 4/50 rule of thumb, which has proven useful in economic and anti-trust policy, suggests that if four actors control less than fifty percent of a market, the difficulties of collusion overwhelm their ability to coordinate policy even if they share a common objective. The 4/50 rule applied to countries would complicate collusion for political manipulation; the 4/50 rule applied to companies would complicate corporate collusion on oligopoly pricing or other predatory practices that discriminate among buyers (e.g., delayed delivery of new products), of which the Japanese have been accused.²⁰⁶

In circumstances where America has lost, or is in danger of losing the capability to produce certain strategic goods or services, criteria like these would assist U.S. strategic planners in determining if their loss poses a threat to national security. Accordingly, those in which the sources of external supply are concentrated do represent a source of concern and should be eligible for "national security" trade protection; those in which the sources of external supply are deconcentrated do not. "In sum, the security objective of maximizing efficiency and innovation in vital national industries while avoiding foreign dependence requires channeling popular protectionist and neomercantilistic instincts into those narrow areas in which foreign domination actually poses a genuine threat."²⁰⁷

When it is determined that trade protection is warranted on the basis of national security, the form of protection applied should be appropriate to the circumstances. Moran asserts that tariffs are less distorting than quotas, and hold the added bonus of producing rents for the home government.²⁰⁸ Harrison and Prestowitz contend that results-oriented bargaining would often be successful, particularly if the United States were to make it

²⁰⁶ *International Security* Summer 1990: 82.

²⁰⁷ Moran "International Economics" 81-82.

²⁰⁸ Moran "America's Defense Industries" 87.

clear "that it will do what is necessary to sustain them [threatened strategic industries] both through positive domestic programs and appropriate countermeasures."²⁰⁹ Finally, Dam, Deutch, Nye, and Rowe maintain:

*Offsetting subsidies to U.S. producers impose the lowest costs on the economy because they still allow American consumers to enjoy low prices. Retaliatory tariffs impose higher costs than subsidies because they also raise prices to consumers, but they are still an acceptable unilateral response. Quotas (either VERs [Voluntary Export Restraints] or otherwise) should never be chosen. They not only impose the same deadweight costs as tariffs but are also highly distorting to economic growth.*²¹⁰

In addition to its roles of grand facilitator, honest broker and engaged balancer, U.S. grand strategy in Northeast Asia can contribute to security by placing greater emphasis on the maintenance and progress of the nation's economic well-being. While Japan's concept of "comprehensive security" may have its flaws (and limitations), there is also much to be learned from that nation's success. Whether the U.S. approach takes the form of an industrial policy, managed trade, macroeconomic measures, or steps to improve the productivity of American industry is not now the central issue. What is important is that U.S. policy-makers acknowledge that economic strength is an indispensable component of long-term national security. "The basic message is clear: national security can no longer be viewed in exclusively military terms; economic security and industrial competitiveness are also vital considerations."²¹¹ The passing of the Cold War, and the demands of modern Northeast Asia, require that matters of economic and trade policy should no longer be subservient to military affairs.

²⁰⁹ Harrison and Prestowitz 74.

²¹⁰ "Harnessing Japan" 37.

²¹¹ Inman and Burton 133.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

National interests comprise the underpinnings of U.S. grand strategy in Northeast Asia. Because grand strategies are meant to provide a framework for long-term planning, the interests that guide those policies must be broad and enduring. By examining U.S. interests through the lens of history, and consulting the Constitution, it is possible to deduce the nation's most basic national security interests: defense of the United States and its constitutional system; enhancement of the nation's economic well-being; creation of a favorable world order; and the promotion of U.S. democratic values and the free-market system. Although each of these interests can have direct application to Northeast Asia, taken together they suggest that the most fundamental U.S. security interest in Northeast Asia is the maintenance of a stable and effective regional environment in which no one state reigns preeminent.

While the end of superpower confrontation has eased tension throughout Northeast Asia, it has also created a new set of circumstances, and thus altered the nature of regional threats to U.S. security interests. The relatively stable bi-, or tripolar structure that characterized Northeast Asian state-to-state relations during the Cold War has given way to a more complex and dynamic multipolar environment. No longer constrained by the imperative of retaining U.S. security guarantees, America's postwar allies may increasingly find the political courage to step out of line with U.S. policies.

Structural factors could also influence the security environment in post-Cold War Northeast Asia. Without the restraint provided by the threat of escalation to global nuclear war, long buried indigenous conflicts may reemerge to threaten regional stability. Another possibility is that differential economic growth, and the resulting shift in the regional balance of power, could create tensions and conflict. Finally, the geo-political world views that shape policy in Beijing, Moscow, Seoul and Pyongyang pose a danger if those nations perceive a disequilibrium in Northeast Asian power relations.

Domestic sources might also contribute to regional instability. A civil war in China, or worse yet, its disintegration, would undoubtedly bring about enormous upheaval throughout Northeast Asia. Similarly, continued turmoil within Russia might result in any number of outcomes that would be detrimental to regional security. Additionally, the prospect of Korean reunification, while in many ways a positive step for Northeast Asian stability, might also be seen as a threat in Tokyo and Beijing. Lastly, internal pressure on Tokyo to reform its postwar foreign and security policies may eventually produce a Japan whose political and military power is commensurate with its already immense economic strength. While Tokyo should be encouraged to play a larger role, and take more responsibility for regional security, if Japan's transition to a "normal power" is not properly managed by U.S. grand strategy, the result could be damaging to America's interests in Northeast Asia.

Threats to fundamental U.S. security interests might also be heralded by regional trends in military doctrine. Although Northeast Asian armed forces are, in some respects, becoming smaller, their offensive capabilities are on the increase. The large, land-oriented force structures of the postwar period are being replaced by leaner, more mobile forces, whose emphasis is on high-tech air- and sea power. These "post-Desert Storm" forces are characterized by enhanced capabilities for rapid offensives and power projection, and are governed by more aggressive doctrine. These trends could indicate the genesis of a regional "cult of the offensive," much like the dogma that guided pre-World War I military doctrine in Europe. The propagation of offensive doctrine throughout Northeast Asia could aggravate instability, and further endanger U.S. security interests.

The complex and uncertain security environment that has taken shape in post-Cold War Northeast Asia has perplexed U.S. strategic planners. From the "New World Order" to a strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement," America's leaders have struggled to find a new direction for national policies. The end result, however, has not been the

construction of an appropriate grand strategy for the new era, but rather the continuation of policies guided by Cold War inertia.

Contemporary grand strategy for Northeast Asia is rooted in four flawed precepts: first, U.S. policies assume that preeminence is sustainable, and that America will remain the undisputed political, military, and economic leader of Northeast Asia into the foreseeable future; second, the forward deployment of large, ground-based units, specifically in Japan and South Korea, must continue; third, the U.S. will be able to assemble and lead coalitions based on the concept of collective security to protect its interests; and finally, America should retain its binding, bilateral security arrangements with Japan and South Korea.

A plethora of factors have conspired to make these precepts unsuitable for a post-Cold War grand strategy. Powerful domestic and international forces in both Northeast Asia and the United States mandate that U.S. planners find more flexible and cost-effective policies to secure America's interests in the region.

In its most basic form, a grand strategy for the new era would contain diplomatic, military, and economic elements. Diplomatically, a grand strategy of selective engagement would strive to shape the Northeast Asian security environment by keeping the United States actively engaged in world politics. Moreover, such a foreign policy would endeavor to maintain geo-political balances, and ensure regional stability.

The diplomatic aspects of U.S. grand strategy would, first, recognize that while the age of economic interdependence may have signaled the end of geo-politics in Western Europe, this is not yet the case in Northeast Asia. Accordingly, U.S. security policy would make allowances for the regional balance of power, and harness its dynamics for the benefit of America's security interests. Second, U.S. foreign policy would begin the task of gradually transforming America's binding security relationships with Japan and Korea into the more flexible arrangements required by a balance of power environment. Third, America would position itself to serve in the roles of regional balancer, grand

facilitator, and honest broker. Finally, U.S. policies would aspire to create a framework through which responsibility for Northeast Asian security can be incrementally shifted away from sole reliance on the United States, and toward a more balanced arrangement involving all regional actors.

The dilemma posed by Japan presents a challenge for U.S. diplomacy operating under a grand strategy of selective engagement. East Asian fears of a resurgent Japan cannot be discounted. Whether real or imagined, perceptions of Tokyo's intentions could prompt regional actors who feel threatened by Japan to react in a manner inconsistent with normal balancing, thus creating instability and conditions prejudicial to U.S. security interests.

This Japan-inspired conundrum demands that the United States take an active role in ushering Japan onto the world stage as a leading character. First, American policy-makers would carefully guide the transformation of the U.S.-Japan relationship to ensure that Tokyo develops security policies and structures that are acceptable both to Japan and the United States, and not perceived in Northeast Asia as threatening to the regional equilibrium. Second, the U.S. would work to ease any security dilemmas that might result from Japan's rise to great power status by enmeshing Japan in a network of regional and international institutions.

The military aspects of a grand strategy of selective engagement would be maritime in nature, and capitalize on the flexibility and freedom of maneuver available to an insular state. Not currently faced with a continental hegemon, the U.S. has the option of foregoing a heavy, land-based forward defense, while still retaining the capability to act unilaterally, or multilaterally, in the strength, venue, and fashion of its choosing.

The transfigured security environment of post-Cold War Northeast Asia not only allows, but mandates that the United States begin to decrease its reliance on a forward-deployed military posture. In its place, a maritime grand strategy would rely on mobile, flexible forces, deployed by sea or air from U.S. or international territory, to demonstrate

resolve, police trouble spots, protect interests, or enable the introduction of heavier forces when required. Such an approach requires a renewed emphasis on power projection, joint force sequencing, and the assets dictated by the needs of strategic lift. Moreover, if at a future point the United States is required by circumstances to return to a more continental focus, the maritime grand strategy would provide the time and space necessary for transition.

Finally, the economic aspects of national security have taken on added importance in the post-Cold War era. The grand strategy of selective engagement recognizes this reality, and would place greater emphasis on economic elements. Rather than advance an agenda based on rigid ideology, national strategy would serve economic security in an eclectic manner. Focusing on macroeconomic stability and infrastructure, as well as industrial policy and strategic industries, grand strategy would approach economics with two goals in mind: maintaining a rising standard of living for America's population; and assuring the U.S. government a wide range of policy choices, free of foreign economic coercion.

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